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(Under the direction of Sean Sylvia) 
 
The capacity to exercise choice for women and girls is an important development objective, but 
evidence on how health policies and programs affect decision-making is lacking in low-resource settings. 
This study aims to assess three different health interventions that may improve women’s and girls’ 
decision-making power in key life choices in sub-Saharan Africa. The first intervention consists of legal 
reforms that reduce restrictions on abortion, which may allow adolescent girls and young women to stay 
in school longer by delaying marriage and childbearing. I use a difference-in-differences approach to 
analyze the impact of expanding the legal grounds for abortion on marriage, birth, and schooling rates 
among adolescent girls and young women in 18 countries. The second intervention addresses financial 
barriers that might limit women’s ability to choose their preferred contraceptive methods. I use a 
propensity score approach combined with machine learning techniques to evaluate how free access to a 
broad contraceptive method mix affects women’s contraceptive choice in eight countries with high unmet 
needs for family planning. The third intervention distributes HIV self-tests through women with multiple 
sexual partners in Kenya. I use an instrumental variable approach to assess whether disclosing HIV-
negative status affects women’s decision-making in intimate partner and transactional sex relationships. 
Each of these three analyses is presented as a different chapter with an overview that summarizes the 
results. Taken together, this study leverages rigorous econometric methods, fills important evidence gaps 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Specific Aims 
Gender equality and empowerment of women and girls are fundamental human rights, a necessary 
foundation for a sustainable world, and one of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals.1 
Agency, or the capacity to define, pursue, and achieve goals free of violence or retribution, is central to 
the concept of empowerment and starts with decision-making.2,3 Despite years of efforts, women and girls 
today continue to play a limited role in household decision-making, lack educational and economic 
opportunities, and have poor access to essential health services.4 In particular, only half of women of 
reproductive age from developing countries can freely make their own decisions about sexual relations, 
contraceptive use, and health care.5  
Interventions that aim to improve gender equality usually consider empowerment as a pathway to 
other health and development outcomes and encourage women and girls to become agents of change.6–9 
However, empowerment is a development objective in its own right in addition to its instrumental 
value.4,7,10,11 Giving women and girls more choices and agency can be an effective approach to achieving 
gender equality, but evidence on whether and how health policies and programs affect decision-making in 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is lacking.3,7,12–14  
My long-term goal is to contribute to the achievement of gender equality in agency, health, and 
development through evidence-based policies and programs. Given the broad scope of this goal, this 
study aims to assess the impact of three interventions, namely abortion legal reforms, free access to 
expanded family planning services, and HIV-status disclosure, on specific applications of decision-
making related to sexual and reproductive health. First, early pregnancy and childbearing impede 
women’s and girls’ ability to participate in, complete, and benefit from education.15 Legal reforms that 
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expand the grounds under which abortion is permitted may allow adolescent girls and young women to 
stay in school longer by delaying marriage and childbearing responsibilities. Second, financial barriers 
may restrict women’s ability to use their preferred contraceptive methods, especially long-acting 
reversible contraceptives (LARC) that - although more effective - have relatively high upfront costs.16–19 
Providing free access to a broad contraceptive method mix, including both LARC and short-acting 
reversible contraceptives (SARC), may increase contraceptive use, meet women’s various fertility needs, 
and increase their autonomy in contraceptive decision-making in resource-limited settings. Third, women 
with multiple sexual partners who often engage in transactional sex are at increased risk of HIV infection, 
economic hardship, and relationship abuse, especially in a generalized HIV epidemic.20,21 Disclosing 
HIV-negative status to sexual partners may inform women’s decision-making in sexual relationships, 
allow them to negotiate higher prices for transactional sex, and facilitate safer sexual behaviors.  
I tested the hypotheses above through three aims: 
• Aim 1: Assess whether the impact of abortion legal reforms on marriage, birth, and schooling 
rates among adolescent girls and young women differed between ten countries that expanded 
the legal grounds for abortion and eight countries that did not over the period 1996 to 2015; 
• Aim 2: Assess whether access to a broad contraceptive method mix was associated with an 
increase in contraceptive use, LARC use, and autonomy in contraceptive decision-making 
among women in eight countries with high unmet need for family planning services; and 
• Aim 3: Assess whether disclosing one’s own HIV-negative status to sexual partners affected 
intimate partner and transactional sex relationships among women with multiple sexual 
partners in Kenya. 
I conducted heterogeneity analyses in each of the three aims to understand whether and how 
intervention effects differed among population subgroups based on demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics, with a focus on the most vulnerable women and girls in each setting. Despite different 
contexts and mechanisms, the three research aims all focus on ways to improve women’s and girls’ 
agency for better health and well-being in SSA.  
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1.2 Significance 
Gender gaps in access, opportunity, and voice persist in every part of the world in spite of the 
progress in maternal and child health over recent decades.4,7 Policymakers have pursued women’s and 
girls’ empowerment as a means to unlock greater development potential in low- and middle-income 
countries (LMIC), but the ability to exercise choice, which defines empowerment, is also an important 
development objective in its own right.3,10,14,22 Based on the “resources, agency, and achievements” 
framework of empowerment, agency is the process dimension of empowerment and focuses on decision-
making.2,23 Previous research has tended to concentrate on the instrumental impact of women’s agency as 
a determinant of health and household welfare,6,8,9,11–13,24,25 but the ability to make decisions and exercise 
choices is also an essential measure of empowerment independent of the achievement dimension.7,22,23,26 
Thus, research that examines the impact of policies and programs on women’s and girls’ decision-making 
power in its intrinsic value is needed for a more holistic approach to empowerment and policy evaluation. 
To fill this gap, my dissertation aimed to assess how three specific health interventions affected 
women’s and girls’ decision-making power related to sexual and reproductive health. The ability to make 
decisions manifests in key life milestones such as marriage, childbearing, and schooling, which is the 
focus of Aim 1. In SSA, gender disparity in education persists as only 78 females completed upper 
secondary education for every 100 males, and no country has achieved gender parity in tertiary 
education.27 Early childbearing impedes girls’ educational attainment,15,28–36 which contributes to 
adulthood gender gaps in labor force participation, earnings, and agency.37 Legal reforms that expand the 
grounds under which abortion is permitted may improve women’s and girls’ educational attainment by 
offering the option to end an unintended pregnancy, providing access to safe reproductive health services, 
and delaying childbearing and parental responsibilities.38,39 In Aim 1, I evaluated the impact of expanding 
abortion legal grounds on marriage, birth, and schooling outcomes among adolescent girls and young 
women in a region with slow but steady shift towards more liberal abortion laws.40 The results provided 
evidence on the potential of legal reforms as a policy tool to protect girls’ power to determine their own 
life paths. 
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Aim 2 also studied expanded access to health services but focused on the effects of costs on women’s 
decisions in health services utilization. User fees for family planning were introduced in the 1980s in 
many LMIC to ensure the quality of health services and sustainability of health systems, but charging a 
non-zero price for family planning services may lower demand and prevent women from choosing the 
contraceptive methods that best suit their needs and preferences, especially for those on the lower end of 
wealth spectrum.41–46 Free access to a wide range of contraceptive methods gives women more decision-
making power to use the method of their choice when faced with other competing household demands. 
By differentiating contraceptive method types, Aim 2 took a closer look at contraceptive decision-
making, assessed the impact of financial barriers on women’s agency, and provided guidance to policies 
and programs on scaling up family planning services in SSA.   
While Aim 1 and 2 used data from multiple countries in SSA, Aim 3 focused on one country and 
evaluated how disclosing HIV-negative status to sexual partners affected intimate partner and 
transactional sex relationships among women with multiple sexual partners in Kenya. Women who 
engage in transactional sex are at increased risk of HIV infection due to their concurrent sexual 
partnerships, inconsistent condom use, and risks of violence, criminalization, and marginalization.20,21 
Disclosing HIV-negative status to sexual partners may influence relationship stability, allow women to 
negotiate higher prices for transactional sex, and facilitate safer sexual behaviors. However, such a 
strategy might not increase women’s agency in sexual relationships due to gender-based power dynamics. 
Existing literature has focused on HIV-positive women and has not explored the potentially empowering 
effects of disclosing HIV-negative status on women’s agency in a generalized HIV epidemic. To illustrate 
these broader social and economic impacts, Aim 3 assessed the effects of disclosing HIV-negative status 
on women’s intimate partner relationships, transactional sex prices, and sexual behaviors. 
This study is significant because it demonstrated the potential and limitation of different public health 
interventions, from country-level policies to individual behaviors, in enhancing women’s ability to 
exercise agency in resource-limited settings. Understanding the social and economic implications of 
health interventions, especially their differential impacts on the most vulnerable segments of the 
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population, is also important as countries in SSA continue to face hard choices in resource allocation in 
their efforts to scale up health services.  
1.3 Innovation 
This study is innovative because the three aims leverage rigorous econometric methods and study 
designs to fill important gaps in the literature. For Aim 1, previous studies have demonstrated that 
restrictive abortion laws negatively affect women’s well-being and abortion reforms improve schooling 
and employment among minority groups in high-income settings.47–51 However, no study has examined 
the causal effects of abortion laws on marriage, birth, and schooling outcomes among adolescent girls and 
young women in SSA. By using a pseudo-panel dataset constructed from multiple data sources, Aim 1 
evaluated the effects of a large-scale policy intervention on decisions critical to the health and 
development of adolescent girls and young women. For Aim 2, although evidence from developed 
countries demonstrates that removing financial barriers shifts contraceptive method choice,52,53 research 
on vouchers for contraceptives from SSA has produced mixed results.54–58 Linking health facility and 
individual data from eight countries, Aim 2 combined traditional econometric methods and machine 
learning techniques to examine how community-level access to family planning services affected 
women’s contraceptive use and decision-making. The results from this aim provided a nuanced 
understanding of the reach of financial subsidies and contribute to the literature on the effect of price for 
public health commodifies in SSA. For Aim 3, existing literature on HIV-status disclosure has focused on 
identifying interventions to safely disclose HIV-positive status as HIV-positive women are at increased 
risks of violence, discrimination, and relationship dissolution.59–61 However, for women who have 
multiple sexual partners and often engage in transactional sex, disclosing HIV-negative status has 
important implications for their intimate partner and transactional sex relationships in a generalized HIV 
epidemic. Aim 3 leveraged the exogenous variation in HIV-status disclosure from a randomized design to 
assess whether women could use HIV-negative status to make informed decisions about their sexual 
relationships. The results from this study contribute to the small but growing literature on the broader 
benefits of expanded HIV testing services beyond identifying HIV-positive cases.62–64 
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1.4 Guide to the Dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 examines the effects of abortion 
legal reforms on marriage, birth, and schooling outcomes among adolescent girls and young women. 
Chapter 3 looks at the effects of free access to a broad contraceptive method mix on women’s 
contraceptive use and decision-making in eight countries with high unmet need for family planning 
services. Chapter 4 explores the effects of disclosing HIV-negative status on intimate partner and 










CHAPTER 2: ABORTION LAWS AND LIFE CHOICES OF ADOLESCENT GIRLS AND 
YOUNG WOMEN IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: A CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSIS 
 
2.1 Overview 
Background: Early marriage and pregnancy impede the educational attainment of adolescent girls 
and young women in sub-Saharan Africa. Expanding the legal grounds for abortion makes it easier and 
safer to end unintended pregnancies, but it is not clear whether such high-level policy changes could 
delay marriage, reduce childbirth, and promote education among girls and young women.  
Methods: Using data from 18 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, we estimate the effects of abortion 
liberalization on marriage, birth, and schooling rates among girls and young women aged between 13 and 
22 years. We use a difference-in-differences approach, comparing outcomes in ten countries that 
expanded the legal grounds for abortion and eight countries where abortion laws remained restrictive over 
the period 1996 to 2015.  
Results: Expanding legal grounds for abortion led to a reduction of 2.5 percentage points (95% 
confidence intervals [CI]: -0.050 – -0.001), or 8.6%, in the annual likelihood of marriage and 0.7 
percentage point (95% CI: -0.013 – -.002), or 7.3%, in the annual likelihood of birth. The legal reforms 
were not associated with a statistically significant effect on schooling. Effects on marriage and birth were 
largest among those from younger age groups, rural areas, and lower wealth quintiles. The results were 
robust to several sensitivity analyses. 
Conclusions: Expanding the legal grounds for abortion enhanced the ability of adolescent girls and 
young women to delay marriage and childbearing. Despite the lack of effects on schooling, this study 





Early marriage and pregnancy impede the educational attainment of adolescent girls and young 
women in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).15,29,31,32,35,65 In 2018, only 78 girls completed upper secondary 
education for every 100 boys, and no country had achieved gender equality in tertiary education in this 
region.27 Despite having the highest adolescent pregnancy rates in the world,66 adolescent girls and young 
women in SSA still face pregnancy-based discrimination in schools that do not apply to their male 
counterparts, including punitive measures that expel pregnant girls from schools, lack of support for 
young mothers to return after childbearing, and restrictive gender norms that prioritize women’s role in 
motherhood above all else.67 The disparities in educational attainment early in life limit women’s labor 
force participation and earnings, affect the health and development trajectories of both women and their 
children, and contribute to large gender gaps in decision-making in the household, community, and 
political sphere.37  
Expanding the legal grounds for abortion may allow adolescent girls and young women to stay in 
school longer by offering the option to end unintended pregnancies, providing better access to safe 
reproductive health services, and delaying marriage and parenting responsibilities.38,39,68 Studies of legal 
reforms in the U.S. in the 1970s and Mexico in 2007 showed that more liberal abortion laws increased 
induced abortions, delayed marriage, and lowered fertility by providing better access to abortion 
services.69,70 The liberalization of abortion laws in the 1970s and 1980s was associated with women’s 
higher educational attainment through delaying childbearing in Norway, Spain, and the U.S.50,71,72  
Compared with high-income countries, the abortion rate is lower in SSA but abortion is still common: 
in 2010-2014, an estimated 15% of all pregnancies ended in abortion in SSA compared with 27% in 
developed countries.73,74 Restrictive abortion laws force women to undergo unsafe procedures, put women 
at greater risk of physical harm, and disproportionally affect women from disadvantaged socioeconomic 
backgrounds.40,48,68,74 For example, it is usually more difficult for women with limited economic means to 
access abortion services, especially safe procedures.40,48 It is within the context of safe motherhood and 
reducing maternal mortality that the heads of government of the African Union approved the Protocol to 
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the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa in 2003, which 
recommended state parties authorize medical abortion when continued pregnancy endangers the life, 
physical health, and mental health of the mother.75 
However, it is not clear whether such high-level policy changes would translate to greater access to 
abortion services and influence marriage, childbearing, and education outcomes of adolescent girls and 
young women. Legal changes are only the first step to make abortion safer and more accessible; clear 
implementation guidelines, trained healthcare providers, and resources to scale up reproductive health 
services are all important prerequisites.40,76,77 Even with good access, more liberal abortion laws might not 
increase induced abortion because countries that support women’s reproductive rights often provide better 
family planning services, reducing unintended pregnancies and the need for abortion.73,78 Additionally, 
many women do not have accurate knowledge of current abortion laws, making it difficult for them to 
operationalize increased legal access. Moreover, since the majority of abortions are obtained by married 
women,73,79 changes in abortion policies might not affect adolescent girls and young women in SSA as 
their marriage and childbearing decisions are often driven by poverty, inequitable gender norms, and 
socio-cultural values.80,81 Lastly, when given the option to delay marriage or childbearing, adolescent girls 
and young women might still choose to drop out of school due to economic, social, and structural barriers 
that play a larger and more direct role in girls’ schooling choices than early marriage and pregnancy.27  
Despite the poor reproductive health and education outcomes among adolescent girls and young 
women in SSA and the need to assess the impacts of abortion laws in the region, existing evidence on the 
link between abortion laws and outcomes among adolescent girls and young women is concentrated in 
high-income settings and the only study from SSA used a cross-sectional approach.82 The objective of this 
study, therefore, is to estimate the effects of liberalized abortion laws on women’s and girls’ key life 
choices in marriage, childbearing, and schooling in SSA. We used data from 18 countries spanning 20 
years to examine whether expanding the legal grounds for abortion leads to greater development 




Using data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) supplemented by other policy datasets, 
we estimated the effects of expanding legal grounds for abortion on key life choices of adolescent girls 
and young women in 18 countries in SSA. Specifically, we used a difference-in-differences (DID) 
approach to compare trends in marriage, births, and schooling in countries that expanded abortion legal 
grounds to those in countries that did not in the 20-year period from 1996 to 2015. We examined the 
policy impacts among subgroups and performed sensitivity analyses to check the robustness of the study 
findings. 
2.3.1 Data and sample  
We combined data from three sources for the study. First, country-year data on abortion legality from 
1996 to 2015 came from the World Population Policies Database maintained by the Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs at the United Nations.83 This dataset provides information on government 
views and policies from 197 countries on reproductive health. The surveys were conducted decennially 
from 1976 and biennially from 2001 to 2015, but data on abortion legality were only collected since 1996. 
The policy data were based on a detailed review of national plans and strategies, program reports, 
legislative documents, and official responses to the United Nations Inquiry among Governments on 
Population and Development.84 Second, individual-level survey data were extracted from the Women’s 
Questionnaire in the DHS conducted between 1997 to 2018 in 18 countries in SSA (Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Keya, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, and Zimbabwe) harmonized 
by the IPUMS-DHS project.85 We excluded five countries (Ghana, Guinea, Tanzania, Uganda, and 
Zambia) that already had relatively liberal abortion laws in 1996 (i.e., where abortion was allowed by law 
to preserve a woman’s mental health). The dataset includes each woman’s year of birth, total years of 
education, birth history, and household characteristics. Third, country-year data on primary school 
starting age were obtained from the World Development Indicator database from the World Bank.86 
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Using the DHS data, we constructed a longitudinal cohort with repeated observations for all female 
respondents that were at most 22 years of age in 1996 and at least 12 years of age in 2015. The analytical 
dataset consisted of binary variables to indicate marital status, birth, and school enrollment for each 
person-year together with other individual characteristics.  
2.3.2 Measures 
Abortion legal reform. We measured abortion legal reform in individual countries first as a binary 
indicator of whether abortion was allowed on all three grounds in a specific year: to save a woman’s life, 
to preserve a woman’s physical health, and to preserve a woman’s mental health. Although truly liberal 
laws in the abortion legality continuum should permit abortion for socioeconomic reasons or without 
restriction as to reason, our definition of “liberal” abortion laws accommodates the fact that Zambia was 
the only country in SSA with DHS data where abortion was broadly legal as of December 2017.40 Among 
the 18 countries that had restrictive abortion laws in 1996, ten countries had expanded the legal grounds 
for abortion by 2015 while the abortion laws in eight countries remained highly restrictive. Given the 
structure of the data collection schedule, we assumed abortion laws did not change in the years without 
policy surveys (e.g., we assumed the abortion laws in 1997, a year without abortion policy data, remained 
the same as the laws in 1996).  
Since countries that eventually expanded abortion legal grounds to include “mental health” started 
from different places in the continuum of abortion legality, we recoded abortion legal reform to 
differentiate between countries with “large” versus “small” expansion of abortion policy. A country that 
initially only allowed abortion to save a woman’s life and liberalized their laws to allow abortion to save a 
woman’s life, to preserve a woman’s physical health, and to preserve a woman’s mental health was coded 
as a “large-expansion” country. In contrast, countries that initially allowed abortion to preserve a 
woman’s physical health in addition to saving life were coded as “small”-expansion countries. Figure 1 
shows the changes in abortion legality over 20 years in the 18 countries included in the study. 
Outcome variables. We used similar methods to create three binary variables to measure marital 
status, childbirth, and school enrollment in each year before an individual turned 22 years of age. For 
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marital status, we created a variable to indicate whether an individual was married in each calendar year 
based on year of interview, an individual’s age in the survey year, and her age of first marriage or 
cohabitation. For childbirth, we created a variable to indicate whether a woman or girl gave birth in a 
specific year based on the year of birth for all children she had. For school enrollment, we created a 
variable to indicate whether a woman or girl was in school based on her total years of education and 
country-year-specific primary school starting age. Specifically, we first calculated the individual’s year of 
birth by subtracting age from the year of interview. Then, we calculated the year when an individual 
ended schooling by summing up the year of birth, the number of years before primary school for each 
birth cohort by country, and the total years of education for each individual. This calculation assumed that 
all children in a birth-cohort in a specific country started primary school at the same age and there was no 
interruption in individuals’ school attendance.  
Control variables. Individual characteristics, including age, residence (rural or urban), and 
household wealth quintiles, were extrapolated as control variables from the year when the DHS surveys 
were conducted. This assumes there was no physical or social mobility among the women and girls in the 
dataset (e.g., an individual surveyed in rural areas was considered a rural resident across all survey years).   
2.3.3. Statistical analyses 
We estimated the effects of expanding the legal grounds for abortion using the following two-way 
fixed-effect linear probability model:  
!"#$ = & + ()*+,-#$ + .# + /$ + 0"#$′2 + 3"#$  
where Yijt is the outcome variable set to 1 if individual i from country j in year t was married, gave 
birth, or was enrolled in school, Treatjt is set to one if individual i resided in country j that had expanded 
legal grounds for abortion laws in year t, cj is a full set of country dummies to control for time-invariant 
country characteristics, dt is a full set of year dummies to account for secular trends, and Zijt is a vector of 
descriptive characteristics including age, rurality, and household wealth index quintiles. The coefficient of 
interest is (, which represents the DID estimate of the abortion legal reform, or the average annual change 
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in the likelihood of schooling among women and girls in countries with more liberal abortion laws. We 
clustered standard errors at the country level.87 
To test whether the effects vary by the extent of legal reform, we fitted a linear probability model 
specified below:   
!"#$ = & + (45,*6+#$ + (789,::#$ + .# + /$ + 0"#$; 2 + 3"#$	
where Largejt is set to one if individual i resided in country j that had expanded legal grounds for abortion 
from only allowing abortion to save a woman’s life in year t and Smalljt is set to one if individual i resided 
in country j that had expanded legal grounds for abortion from allowing abortion to save a woman’s life 
and to preserve her physical health in year t. The coefficients (4 and	(7 capture the impacts of different 
extent of legal reform (i.e., “large” expansion vs. “small” expansion). We used a Wald test to assess the 
equality hypothesis between (4 and	(7.  
We conducted additional subgroup and sensitivity analyses. First, to examine whether the treatment 
effects vary by key demographic variables, we repeated the main analyses for subgroups based on 
individuals’ age group, residence (urban vs. rural), and household wealth quintile. Second, we checked 
whether the main assumption of the DID design was valid, i.e., the “parallel trend” assumption that 
countries with more liberal abortion laws would have identical trends in the outcomes as countries with 
more restrictive abortion laws in the absence of any legal reform. Although this could not be directly 
tested, we fit a linear probability model that excluded observations from treatment countries in years after 
the policy change to compare the pre-trends between treatment and comparison countries. Third, we 
excluded one country at a time from the dataset to check whether the results were driven by any single 
country. Fourth, because the policy survey was only conducted in selective years during the 20-year 
period, we also restricted the analysis to only years where abortion legality was surveyed. Lastly, we 
tested the effects of abortion liberalization on marriage and schooling in a sample that included also men 
and boys using a triple-difference model. Specifically, we hypothesized that abortion liberalization should 
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not affect the schooling of young men and boys and would affect their marriage, if at all, to a lesser 
degree than the marriage of women and girls.  
Statistical tests were 2-sided and we set the statistical significance at p<.05. Analyses were performed 
using Stata, version 15.1 (StataCorp LLC). 
2.4 Results 
The full sample contained 1,786,310 woman-year observations, of which 994,168 (55.7%) were from 
the ten countries that expanded abortion legal grounds between 1996 and 2015 and the remaining 792,142 
(44.3%) were from the eight comparison countries (see Table 1). Among the 270,422 individuals in the 
sample, at the age of 15 years, 3% were married, 0.8% gave birth, and 23% were enrolled in school; at 
age 22, 58.7%, 10.5%, and 1.8% were married, gave birth, and enrolled in school respectively. Detailed 
information showing country-specific marriage, birth, and schooling rates are presented in Table A1.  
The main results are presented in Table 2. The average annual likelihood of marriage was 2.5 
percentage points lower after the legal reform (95% confidence interval [CI]: -0.050 – -0.001), or a 
decrease of 8.6% relative to a control mean of 28.8%. The average annual likelihood of giving births was 
0.7 percentage point lower after the legal reform (95% CI: -0.013 – -.002), or a decrease of 7.3% relative 
to a control mean of 9.5%. The legal reform was not associated with a statistically significant effect on 
schooling outcomes. While the effect of “small” expansion (i.e., from “saving life and preserving physical 
health” to “saving life and preserving physical and mental health”) on marriage was significant, we were 
not able to detect a statistically different effect between “small” and “large” expansions on marriage (p-
value = 0.092). The effect on birth was different by the extent of legal change and “small” expansion had 
a larger impact than “large” expansion on birth (p-value = 0.027).  
Heterogeneity. The effects of abortion legal expansion varied considerably by age groups (Table 3). 
For those between 13 and 15 years of age, expanding abortion legal grounds reduced the likelihood of 
marriage by 0.8 percentage point (95% CI -0.016 – -0.000), a sizable 16% reduction from before the 
expansion, but did not affect birth or schooling. For those between 16 and 18 years of age, the legal 
change reduced the likelihood of giving birth by 0.5 percentage points (95% CI -0.010 – -0.001) and 
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“small” expansion had stronger effects than “large” expansion. In “small” expansion countries, there is 
also a significant reduction in marriage by 2.4 percentage points (95% CI -0.044 – -0.005) among those 
between 16 and 18 years of age. For those above 18 years of age, changes in abortion laws had no 
statistically significant effect on any of the three outcomes despite larger point estimates of marriage and 
birth than those of younger groups. 
Similarly, the effects of abortion legal expansion varied by wealth quintiles, assuming individuals’ 
household economic status remained the same as that of the DHS survey year (Table 4). For women and 
girls from the poorest wealth quintile, the legal change lowered the likelihood of marriage and birth by 
6.0 percentage points (95% CI -0.094 – -0.026) and 1.7 percentage points (95% CI -0.028 – -0.005) 
respectively. In addition, “small” expansion increased school attendance among this poorest group by 3.5 
percentage points (95% CI 0.001 – 0.069). For those from the richest wealth quintile, the legal change did 
not affect any of the three outcomes. For those in between, the legal change reduced the likelihood of 
birth but not marriage.  
In terms of residence, abortion legal reform only affected those from rural but not urban areas (Table 
5). For women and girls who lived in rural areas (at least in the DHS survey years), expanding abortion 
legal grounds was associated with a reduction of 3.6 percentage points (95% CI -0.067 – -0.005) in the 
annual likelihood of marriage, or 10.4% from before the expansion. The effect on birth was of similar 
magnitude at 1.2 percentage points (95% CI -0.019 – -0.005) or 10.3% from before the expansion. 
Moreover, “small” expansion was associated with a 5.1 percentage point increase (95% CI 0.011 – 
0.091), or 19.8%, in schooling compared to no expansion and was statistically significantly different from 
“large” expansion (p-value = 0.017).  
Sensitivity analyses. We tested the robustness of the main results with the following sensitivity 
analyses. First, the test for parallel pre-trends showed that while marriage and birth were declining in all 
countries during the 20-year period, the trends in marriage, birth, or schooling did not differ between the 
treatment and comparison countries in the years before legal reforms (Table 6). 
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The effects of legal reforms were not sensitive to excluding any single country’s data, except for the 
effect on schooling when Senegal was dropped from the dataset (Figure 2). Without Senegal, the 
expansion of abortion legal grounds was associated with a 2.9 percentage point increase in schooling 
(Table A2; 95% CI: 0.003 – 0.051). This might be explained by other policy changes unique to Senegal 
that affected schooling independent of abortion laws. According to the UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 
only two countries among the 18 countries in the dataset changed the duration of compulsory education 
between 1998 and 2015: in Senegal, a comparison country, compulsory education duration was increased 
from six to 11 years in 2004 and in Kenya, a treatment country, compulsory education duration was 
increased from eight to 12 years in 2013.88 Assuming compulsory education policies were implemented 
well, schooling in Senegal could have increased due to the effect of longer compulsory education. Thus, 
including Senegal as a comparison country would have violated the common trend assumption of DID. 
Similarly, the effect of abortion legal expansion in Kenya, if any, might have been partially attributed to 
the change in compulsory education duration, but the magnitude of bias might be smaller since the change 
in compulsory education occurred towards the very end of the 20-year period in 2013. To minimize the 
potential bias due to changes in compulsory education duration, we dropped Kenya and Senegal and 
repeated the main analyses (Table A3), which showed that abortion legal expansion was associated with a 
3.0 percentage point, or 8.7%, increase in the likelihood of being in school (95% CI 0.001 – 0.059). 
Similar to the patterns in marriage and birth, the effect of “small” expansion was stronger than the effect 
of “large” expansion. However, we were not able to rule out other potential confounders.  
When the dataset included only years when abortion policy was surveyed, the effect on marriage was 
no longer statistically significant (Table A4). However, the average annual likelihood of giving birth was 
still 1.2 percentage point lower (95% CI -0.023 – -0.001), or 12.8%, after the expansion of abortion legal 
grounds. 
The triple-difference models showed that abortion legal changes did not affect men’s marriage or 
schooling (Table A5). The coefficients of the treatment and female interaction term had the expected 
signs but were not statistically significant in the full sample. However, abortion legal expansion had 
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gender-differential effects for older age groups, reducing the likelihood of marriage by 5.1 percentage 
points (95% CI: -0.098 – -0.003) and 5.8 percentage points (95% CI: -0.116 – -0.000) for women aged 16 
– 18 years and 19 – 22 years respectively compared to their male counterparts. In addition, in “small-
expansion” countries, abortion legal change reduced the likelihood of marriage in the full sample by 6.5 
percentage points (95% CI: -0.125 – -0.006) among women compared to men, assuming men were not 
affected by the legal change.  
2.5 Discussion 
Abortion laws play a critical role in adolescent girls’ and young women’s ability to access healthcare 
services, make reproductive decisions, and plan for their future. For policymakers, it is important to 
understand the broader implications of abortion laws as 15% of all pregnancies end in abortion in 
Africa.73 To our knowledge, this is the first cross-country study in SSA that assessed the impacts of 
abortion laws on key life choices of adolescent girls and young women who usually have limited access 
to family planning services and face gender-based barriers to pursuing development opportunities.27,89 
Using quasi-experimental methods and cross-country data sources, this study found that expanding 
abortion legal grounds was associated with a reduction of more than 7% in the annual likelihood of 
marriage and birth among adolescent girls and young women in SSA. Although legal reforms might 
coincide with changes in other socioeconomic factors and laws alone do not guarantee access to 
reproductive health services,76,77,79,90,91 a country’s decision to expand legal grounds for abortion 
nonetheless signals stronger political will to protect women’s health and human rights and is likely to be 
correlated with greater access to reproductive health services. The results of this study demonstrated such 
state-level policy instruments enhanced young women’s and girls’ ability to make decisions about 
marriage and childbearing.  
The subgroup analyses showed that the liberalization of abortion laws was especially beneficial to 
women who were younger, in rural areas, and from lower wealth quintiles. Since an estimated 3 million 
adolescent girls were married annually in SSA,92 a 7% reduction would roughly translate into an effect 
that allows more than 200,000 girls to avoid child marriage each year. Allowing adolescents to postpone 
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births has major implications for maternal and child health in addition to girls’ development 
opportunities.93 Pregnancy and childbirth complications are the leading cause of death for girls aged 15 – 
19 years in developing countries and babies of adolescent mothers face higher risks of low birth weight, 
preterm delivery, and severe neonatal conditions.94,95 Our results also show that such legal reforms were 
progressive in that they helped those with the least wealth avoid childbirth and marriage. This is a 
promising finding since these women are most likely to experience complications from unsafe abortions 
whereas wealthier women are more likely to access abortion services even in the absence of legal 
reforms.48  
This study also found that “small” expansion of abortion legal grounds had stronger effects than 
“large” expansion, which seems counterintuitive as it suggests abortion reform would be less effective if a 
country took a larger step towards more liberal laws on the abortion legality continuum. However, all 
countries that had a “large” expansion of abortion laws started with extremely restrictive abortion policies 
in 1996 (i.e., only allowing abortion to save a woman’s life) while all countries that had a “small” 
expansion started with less restrictive abortion policies (i.e., allowing abortion to save a woman’s life and 
preserve physical health). This difference in the starting point may reflect how ready a country’s health 
sector was to scale up its reproductive health services after the legal change. For example, a “small”-
expansion country might have had more trained healthcare workers, better healthcare infrastructure, and 
more accepting social norms about abortion before the reform. As a result, women and girls could obtain 
an abortion under the ground of “preserving mental health” after the reform. By comparison, in a “large”-
expansion country where abortion was rarely performed before the legal change, the health sector might 
be less prepared to expand reproductive health services and its providers who were used to prior 
restrictive laws might be more likely to impose their personal bias, posing significant barriers for women 
and girls to access abortion even with the legal reform. Although we are unable to draw definitive 
conclusions, the larger effects of “small” expansion might indicate the limitation of high-level policy 
change alone without social norm shifts or adequate resources, instead of evidence for the lack of effects 
of more liberal laws. 
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Despite the sizable effects on marriage and birth, the study did not find any downstream effect of 
abortion legal reform on schooling, except for those from the lowest wealth quintile in “small”-expansion 
countries. In contrast, previous studies on abortion liberalization in the 1970s and 1980s from developed 
countries have shown a strong link between abortion laws and young women’s education outcomes 
through delayed marriage and childbearing, although such effects might have only occurred to subgroups 
of population (e.g., black but not white women in the U.S.) and at specific educational levels (e.g., college 
but not high school in Norway and vice versa in Spain).50,71,72 Since child marriage and early childbearing 
are known factors that limit girls’ educational potential in SSA,28,32–35,65,91,96,97 it is puzzling that the 
reforms’ effects on marriage and childbearing did not translate into higher school enrollment in this study. 
This might be because early marriage and pregnancy only explained less than 20% of school dropouts in 
the case of francophone Africa.15 Alternatively, women and girls who chose to obtain an abortion to delay 
marriage or childbearing under the more liberal laws might have dropped out of school even if they did 
not become pregnant, perhaps due to economic shocks. A closer examination of country-specific abortion 
laws, education systems, and socioeconomic contexts similar to the analyses conducted in developed 
countries will provide stronger evidence on whether and how abortion laws affect education in low-
resource settings.   
This study has several limitations. First, we used selective and distinct legal grounds to categorize 
abortion laws at the country level, which did not capture the complex policy nuances of abortion policies 
or reflect how these laws were interpreted in practice.76,98 However, the oversimplified classification of 
abortion laws made the cross-country comparison possible and were used by the best longitudinal policy 
data we had access to.83 Future studies could take advantage of other measures of abortion laws, such as 
the Global Abortion Policies Database,99 to develop a more systematic framework for abortion legality 
and assess the effects on access to services and of other dimensions of abortion laws. Second, although 
the DID approach controlled for unobserved time-invariant confounders, other factors that were not fixed 
over time might still have biased the results. The fact that excluding Senegal from the original dataset 
produced different effect estimates on schooling led us to consider the changes in compulsory education 
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duration, which is by no means the only country-specific time-varying factor. Nonetheless, the main 
results were not affected by the omission of any country other than Senegal. Third, we extrapolated data 
from cross-sectional surveys to construct a pseudo-panel dataset, an approach that has been used in other 
studies,100,101 which created considerable measurement errors in key demographic variables such as 
residence or wealth. However, these errors were unlikely to be related to abortion policy changes and the 
subgroup analyses showed stronger effects among those from rural areas and poorer backgrounds. Fourth, 
to estimate an individuals’ schooling status, we assumed every cohort of girls in a country started primary 
school at the same age while in reality delayed entry to primary school is common.102 Since the sample 
was restricted to women and girls who were still in school at the age of 12, it is possible that some 
observations may have been misclassified as “out of school”, but it is unlikely that such measurement 
errors are correlated with the abortion policy change. Fifth, related to the school-attendance criterion in 
sample selection, individuals in our dataset are a relatively privileged group as only 67% of women and 
girls completed primary education in SSA in 2018.27 This limits the generalizability of the study findings. 
Sixth, we chose to use linear models for easier interpretability of parameter estimates. However, such 
models could yield out-of-range predictions when the true probabilities are close to 0 or 1, as in the case 
of the birth outcome we examined. Non-linear models, such as logistic regressions, might fit the data 
better for rare outcomes. Last, we did not examine how abortion laws were applied in practice or assess 
their effects on abortion incidence. Previous studies found that abortion rates were similar regardless of 
the abortion legal grounds in a country.73 The effects of laws on marriage or births might be spurious if 
more liberal laws did not reduce the number of abortions. However, a country’s decision to adopt more 
liberal abortion laws is likely to prelude or reflect a shift in social norms that are more supportive of 
women’s agency, which enhances the ability of adolescent girls and young women to decide the timing of 
marriage and childbearing independent of fertility outcomes.  
2.6 Conclusions 
Policy reforms that expanded the legal grounds for abortion were associated with reductions in 
marriage and birth but had no effect on schooling among adolescent girls and young women in SSA. 
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Whether such reforms improved access to reproductive health services or merely signaled greater political 
will to protect women’s health and rights, the liberalization of abortion laws enhanced the ability of 
adolescent girls and young women to make key life choices, had important implications for maternal and 
child health, and were especially beneficial to those with the fewest resources. This study adds to our 
understanding of the broader implications of reproductive health policies to women’s agency beyond 
saving lives from unsafe abortion practices.  
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FIGURE 1: Changes in legal grounds for abortion between 1996 and 2015 
 
This figure shows the changes in the legal grounds under which abortion was allowed in each country from 1996 to 2015 
based on the World Population Policies Database – 2015 Revision (https://esa.un.org/poppolicy/wpp_datasets.aspx). The surveys 
on abortion policies were conducted first in 1996 and then biennially from 2001 to 2015. Given these gaps in survey years, the 
“Year of change” data are approximate. For example, in Benin, abortion was only allowed under the ground to save women’s life 
in 1996. By 2015, Benin had expanded the legal grounds to allow abortion to preserve women’s physical and mental health. The 
legal change, represented by an arrow in the figure, occurred on or before 2005 (a year when abortion policy was surveyed). By 
comparison, in Congo (DR), abortion was only allowed to save women’s life in 1996 and this did not change in 2015, represented 
by a dot in the figure. 
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FIGURE 2. Effects of expanding abortion legal grounds, excluding one country at a time 
 
This figure shows the estimated effects of expanding abortion legal grounds on marriage, birth, and schooling using a 
dataset that originally included 18 countries from sub-Saharan Africa. Each bar represents the estimated effect when excluding 








Each bar represents the estimated effect when one country was excluded from the dataset.
excluding Senegal
Effects of expanding abortion legal grounds
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Number of individual-year observations  994,168   792,142   1,786,310  
Number of individual-year observations after 
legal change 
 655,161  --  655,161  
Number of individuals in sample  151,466   118,956   270,422  
Number of countries in sample 10 8 18 
Marriage rate per 1,000 person-years 240.7 301.1 267.5 
Birth rate per 1,000 person-years 84.6 96.7 90.0 
Schooling rate per 1,000 person-years 375.4 338.3 358.9 
Note: Treated countries (year of change in abortion legality based on the World Population Policies Database): Benin (2005), 
Burkina Faso (2001), Burundi (2001), Cameroon (2001), Ethiopia (2005), Kenya (2001), Mozambique (2001), Niger (2009), 
Nigeria (2001), Rwanda (2001). Comparison countries: Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Senegal, and Zimbabwe. Marriage, birth, and schooling rates are calculated as simple means across all person-
years.   
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TABLE 2. Effects of expanding abortion legal grounds on marriage, birth, and schooling  
 Marriage Birth Schooling 
Post-reform -0.025* -0.007** 0.006 
 [-0.050,-0.001] [-0.013,-0.002] [-0.045,0.057] 
Small  -0.034* -0.009* 0.024 
 [-0.067,-0.002] [-0.017,-0.002] [-0.031,0.078] 
Large  -0.018 -0.006 -0.008 
 [-0.050,0.013] [-0.013,0.001] [-0.058,0.043] 
P-value (Large = Small) 0.092 0.027 0.139 
Age 0.075*** 0.024*** -0.088*** 
 [0.065,0.085] [0.021,0.028] [-0.095,-0.082] 
Rural 0.032** 0.010** -0.049*** 
 [0.010,0.053] [0.004,0.016] [-0.071,-0.026] 
Poorer -0.029** -0.009*** 0.038*** 
 [-0.045,-0.013] [-0.013,-0.004] [0.021,0.055] 
Middle -0.058*** -0.021*** 0.091*** 
 [-0.084,-0.032] [-0.031,-0.011] [0.061,0.120] 
Richer -0.089*** -0.034*** 0.149*** 
 [-0.117,-0.060] [-0.048,-0.021] [0.108,0.191] 
Richest -0.169*** -0.063*** 0.292*** 
 [-0.202,-0.136] [-0.080,-0.046] [0.249,0.334] 
Observations 1786310 1786310 1786310 
Adjusted R2 0.2669 0.0693 0.3393 
Control mean 0.288 0.095 0.350 
95% confidence intervals in brackets 
Included country and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at country level. Small: abortion legal grounds 
expanded from “to save life & preserve physical health” to including “to preserve mental health.” Large: abortion 
legal grounds expanded from “to save life” only to including “to preserve mental health”. Included only individuals 
that were still in school at age 12. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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TABLE 3. Effects of expanding abortion legal grounds by age group 
 13-15 years of age 16 – 18 years of age 19-22 years of age  
Panel A: Marriage     
Treat -0.008* -0.017 -0.033  
 [-0.016,-0.000] [-0.037,0.002] [-0.083,0.017]  
Small  -0.005 -0.024* -0.065  
 [-0.011,0.001] [-0.044,-0.005] [-0.147,0.016]  
Large  -0.011 -0.011 -0.008  
 [-0.022,0.001] [-0.038,0.015] [-0.058,0.042]  
P-value (Large = Small) 0.074 0.057 0.263  
Observations 591096 569924 625290  
Control mean 0.049 0.246 0.561  
Panel B: Birth     
Treat -0.001 -0.005* -0.010  
 [-0.004,0.002] [-0.010,-0.001] [-0.025,0.005]  
Small  -0.001 -0.007** -0.015  
 [-0.005,0.003] [-0.012,-0.003] [-0.040,0.010]  
Large  -0.001 -0.003 -0.007  
 [-0.005,0.003] [-0.010,0.003] [-0.021,0.007]  
P-value (Large = Small) 0.747 0.010 0.374  
Observations 591096 569924 625290  
Control mean 0.015 0.087 0.181  
Panel C: Schooling     
Treat 0.006 0.017 0.003  
 [-0.080,0.092] [-0.044,0.077] [-0.022,0.029]  
Small  0.030 0.027 0.027  
 [-0.065,0.125] [-0.041,0.095] [-0.007,0.060]  
Large  -0.013 0.008 -0.015  
 [-0.095,0.069] [-0.054,0.071] [-0.033,0.004]  
P-value (Large = Small) 0.167 0.636 0.086  
Observations 591096 569924 625290  
Control mean 0.653 0.318 0.079  
95% confidence intervals in brackets 
Included rural/urban, wealth quintile, country, and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at country level. Small: abortion 
legal grounds expanded from “to save life & preserve physical health” to including “to preserve mental health”. Large: abortion 
legal grounds expanded from “to save life” only to including “to preserve mental health”. 
Included only individuals that were still in school at age 12. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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TABLE 4. Effects of expanding abortion legal grounds by wealth quintiles 
 Poorest Poorer Middle Richer Richest 
Panel A: Marriage 
Treat -0.060** -0.044 -0.033 -0.027 -0.006 
 [-0.094,-0.026] [-0.095,0.007] [-0.071,0.004] [-0.056,0.001] [-0.029,0.017] 
Small  -0.060** -0.057* -0.042 -0.041* -0.015 
 [-0.094,-0.026] [-0.105,-0.009] [-0.085,0.001] [-0.077,-0.006] [-0.047,0.017] 
Large  -0.060* -0.036 -0.028 -0.020 0.003 
 [-0.107,-0.014] [-0.100,0.028] [-0.074,0.017] [-0.055,0.015] [-0.022,0.028] 
P-value (Large = Small) 0.003 0.065 0.134 0.074 0.535 
Control mean 0.392 0.356 0.320 0.295 0.220 
Panel B: Birth 
Treat -0.017** -0.015* -0.014* -0.008* 0.000 
 [-0.028,-0.005] [-0.028,-0.003] [-0.024,-0.003] [-0.016,-0.000] [-0.006,0.006] 
Small  -0.007 -0.016* -0.014** -0.010 -0.004 
 [-0.019,0.004] [-0.029,-0.002] [-0.024,-0.004] [-0.024,0.003] [-0.012,0.004] 
Large  -0.024*** -0.015 -0.013 -0.007 0.004 
 [-0.037,-0.012] [-0.031,0.001] [-0.026,0.000] [-0.015,0.001] [-0.002,0.010] 
P-value (Large = Small) 0.003 0.038 0.016 0.131 0.074 
Control mean 0.131 0.121 0.108 0.097 0.069 
Panel C: Schooling 
Treat 0.014 0.023 0.008 0.015 0.007 
 [-0.019,0.048] [-0.022,0.068] [-0.067,0.082] [-0.049,0.080] [-0.037,0.051] 
Small  0.035* 0.040 0.027 0.045 0.026 
 [0.001,0.069] [-0.007,0.087] [-0.055,0.109] [-0.032,0.122] [-0.023,0.074] 
Large  -0.003 0.013 -0.003 -0.000 -0.012 
 [-0.030,0.025] [-0.032,0.058] [-0.077,0.071] [-0.063,0.063] [-0.050,0.025] 
P-value (Large = Small) 0.014 0.058 0.366 0.200 0.134 
Control mean 0.184 0.227 0.281 0.336 0.470 
Observations 158254 230557 305921 407809 683769 
95% confidence intervals in brackets 
Included age, urban/rural, country, and year fixed effects. 
Standard errors clustered at country level. 
Small: abortion legal grounds expanded from “to save life & preserve physical health” to including “to preserve mental health”. 
Large: abortion legal grounds expanded from “to save life” only to including “to preserve mental health”. 
Included only individuals that were still in school at age 12. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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TABLE 5. Effects of expanding abortion legal grounds by rurality 
 Marriage Birth Schooling 
 Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural 
Treat -0.013 -0.036* -0.003 -0.012** -0.009 0.025 
 [-0.033,0.006] [-0.067,-0.005] [-0.007,0.002] [-0.019,-0.005] [-0.075,0.058] [-0.013,0.064] 
Small  -0.019 -0.047* -0.006 -0.012* 0.005 0.051* 
 [-0.043,0.005] [-0.085,-0.009] [-0.012,0.000] [-0.023,-0.001] [-0.065,0.074] [0.011,0.091] 
Large -0.008 -0.028 -0.000 -0.012** -0.019 0.007 
 [-0.036,0.019] [-0.065,0.009] [-0.007,0.007] [-0.020,-0.004] [-0.085,0.046] [-0.030,0.044] 
P-value (Large = Small) 0.253 0.041 0.160 0.009 0.264 0.017 
Observations 875784 910526 875784 910526 875784 910526 
Control mean 0.229 0.345 0.073 0.116 0.439 0.263 
95% confidence intervals in brackets 
Included age, wealth quintile, country, and year fixed effects. 
Standard errors clustered at country level. 
Small: abortion legal grounds expanded from “to save life & preserve physical health” to including “to preserve mental health”. 
Large: abortion legal grounds expanded from “to save life” only to including “to preserve mental health”. 
Included only individuals that were still in school at age 12. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
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TABLE 6. Test for parallel pre-trends 
 Marriage Birth Schooling 




























































Observations 1131149 1131149 1131149 
Adjusted R2 0.2836 0.0720 0.3424 
95% confidence intervals in brackets 
Treated country variable indicates whether a country eventually changed abortion policy. 
The coefficient of interest is the interaction of treated country indicator and linear time trend. 
Included country fixed effects. 
Standard errors clustered at country level. 
Excluded observations from treated countries after the abortion policy was changed. 
Included only individuals that were still in school at age 12. 










CHAPTER 3: FREE ACCESS TO A BROAD CONTRACEPTIVE METHOD MIX AND 
WOMEN’S CONTRACEPTIVE CHOICE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
 
3.1 Overview 
Background: Financial barriers may restrict women’s ability to use their preferred contraceptive 
methods, especially long-acting reversible contraceptives (LARC) that - although more effective - have 
relatively high upfront costs. Providing free access to a broad contraceptive method mix, including both 
LARC and short-acting reversible contraceptives (SARC), may increase contraceptive use, meet women’s 
various fertility needs, and increase their agency in contraceptive decision-making in resource-limited 
settings. 
Methods: Linking health facility and individual data from eight countries in sub-Saharan Africa, we 
examine how free access to a broad contraceptive method mix affects women’s contraceptive choice. We 
use a propensity score approach combined with machine learning techniques to compare current 
contraceptive use, LARC use, and contraceptive decision-making in communities that provide free access 
to both method types and those that do not. 
Results: Free access to both LARC and SARC was associated with an increase of 3.2 percentage 
points (95% confidence interval: 0.006 – 0.058) in the likelihood of modern contraceptive use. This 
increase was driven by greater use of SARC. Among current contraceptive users, free access did not 
prompt women to switch to LARC and had no effect on women’s autonomy in decisions about 
contraceptive methods. The price effects on contraceptive use were larger among women who were older, 
more educated, and more knowledgeable about contraceptive methods, while free access was associated 
with lower contraceptive use among adolescents. 
Conclusions: Providing full or partial subsidies to contraceptives is associated with a modest increase 
in current contraceptive use. While price remains an important policy tool to increase contraceptive 
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uptake, removing user fees alone does not address all barriers women face, especially for the most 
vulnerable groups of women that need family planning services the most.   
3.2 Introduction 
Access to a wide variety of contraceptive methods is a fundamental element of quality of care and a 
critical dimension in multiple frameworks of family planning services.103–105 LARC, including implants 
and intrauterine devices (IUDs), are 20 times as effective as shorter-term methods, have much higher 
continuation rates, and suit women’s growing needs for limiting births.16–19 However, a number of 
demand- and supply-side factors continue to limit women’s uptake of LARC, such as upfront costs that 
often include informal fees, lack of trained providers that could perform both insertion and removal of 
LARC, and concerns about side effects.106–109 Free access to both LARC and SARC may increase 
contraceptive use by meeting women’s various fertility needs in low- and middle-income countries 
(LMIC).  
Free access to a broad contraceptive method mix also gives women greater autonomy in contraceptive 
decision-making, especially for those from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. Previous research has 
shown that women from the poorest wealth quintiles in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are less likely to use 
LARC and such wealth-related inequalities have increased in several countries.109,110 Although the costs 
per couple-year served are similar or even lower for LARC compared to SARC, higher upfront out-of-
pocket costs, including both the commodity prices and additional consultation charges or 
insertion/removal fees, may be a barrier to LARC use.111–114 Since men usually control household 
spending and often have different contraceptive or fertility preferences compared to women, providing 
both LARC and SARC free of charge removes the concern of costs from the decision-making process and 
may increase a woman’s ability to use any contraceptive method without her partner’s knowledge or 
approval.115–117 
Previous literature is mixed on whether free access to contraceptives is effective in increasing 
contraceptive use or optimal for the sustainability of health systems. User fees for family planning were 
introduced in the 1980s in many LMIC to ensure the quality of health services and sustainability of health 
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systems, but charging a price for basic health services may prevent women from choosing the method that 
best suits their needs and preferences, especially for those on the lower end of the wealth spectrum.41,43–46 
For public health products, field experiments have shown that any increase in price can considerably 
dampen demand in SSA.118–123 Specifically for LARC, recent studies showed that removing the cost 
barriers substantially increased LARC use among low-income women and adolescents in the United 
States.52,53,124  
Contrary to these two strands of literature, previous reviews suggest that the effects of price on 
contraceptive use in LMIC have been largely inconclusive due to lack of recent studies, weak study 
designs, and challenges in measuring supply and demand simultaneously.41,54,55,125–127 For example, 
providing free vouchers for contraceptives did not increase contraceptive use or shift method choice 
among postpartum women in Kenya in a randomized controlled trial,56 although quasi-experimental 
studies have shown that vouchers were effective in increasing contraceptive use in Cambodia, Pakistan, 
and Madagascar.58,128,129 In addition, program evaluations of service expansion have demonstrated uptake 
and acceptability of LARC, such as the multi-component LARC expansion initiative (including free or 
subsidized family planning services) implemented by Marie Stopes International across 14 countries in 
SSA.57  
Further evidence is needed to understand whether free access to a broad contraceptive method mix is 
an effective and empowering strategy to meet women’s family planning needs in SSA. To inform pricing 
policies for governments and international donors, this study estimates the effects of providing both 
LARC and SARC free of charge on women’s contraceptive use and agency.  
3.3 Methods 
Linking data from health facility and individual surveys, we estimated whether free access to both 
LARC and SARC was associated with an increase in women’s contraceptive use in eight countries in 
SSA. Among current contraceptive users, we estimated whether free access was associated with increased 
use of LARC and greater autonomy in decisions about contraceptive methods. We combined propensity 
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score weighting with machine learning techniques to account for differences in selection into the 
treatment and estimated differential treatment effects among key subgroups.   
3.3.1 Data and sample  
The data source is Performance Monitoring and Accountability 2020 (PMA2020) harmonized by the 
IPUMS-PMA project.130 PMA2020 collected data annually from 2014 to 2017 from households, women, 
and service delivery points (i.e., health facilities) in 11 countries that have pledged to the Family Planning 
2020 effort. These data are collected by trained enumerators using mobile devices and include key 
indicators of family planning use by individuals as well as provision of reproductive health services by 
healthcare facilities. In particular, PMA2020 surveyed all private facilities located within each 
enumeration area and public facilities that serve the enumeration area, representing facilities accessible to 
women in the community.131 To identify public facilities, the survey team consulted district or local 
authorities to locate public sector facilities designated to cover the residents of each enumeration area, 
which may be located outside of the community.131  
The sample came from the most recent PMA2020 surveys that were conducted in 2016/2017 and are 
representative at the national level in eight countries in SSA, including Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Niger, Nigeria, and Uganda (we excluded countries that do not have nationally-
representative data or are not in SSA). Individual data excluded pregnant women or women who 
expressed the desire to have a child soon. The analysis dataset linked individual data with service delivery 
points data by enumeration area. For the main outcome, use of modern contraceptives, the sample 
included all women of reproductive age. For the other outcomes, use of LARC and autonomy in 
contraceptive decision-making, the sample consisted of women of reproductive age who reported using a 
modern contraceptive method at the time of the survey. 
3.3.2 Measures 
Exposure. The main policy variable of interest, free access to a broad contraceptive method mix, is a 
binary variable coded to 1 if both LARC (implants or intrauterine devices) and SARC (injectables that 
include Depo-Provera and Sayana Press, pills, male/female condoms, diaphragms, spermicide, and n 
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tablets) are routinely provided and offered free of charge in at least one facility that serves an enumeration 
area. Diaphragms, spermicide, and n tablets collectively make up less than 1% of the total method mix 
within our sample. We did not include permanent methods because we expect the decision-making 
process to be different from those for reversible methods. Similarly, we did not include emergency 
contraception because we expect a different user profile for emergency contraception compared to other 
SARC.  
Free access was constructed based on two categories of questions in the Service Delivery Points 
Questionnaire to measure routine provision and charge of family planning services. First, routine 
provision is defined by whether a facility provides a contraceptive method, has trained personnel and 
supplies, and has the devices in stock. Service provision is measured by the question “which of the 
following methods are provided to clients at this facility?”. A facility is considered to routinely provide 
LARC only if it has trained personnel that are able to insert implants/IUDs as measured by the question 
“on days when you offer family planning services, does this facility have trained personnel able to insert 
implants/IUDs?”. A facility also needs to have the supplies necessary to perform the procedures (clean 
gloves, antiseptic, sterile gauze pad, anesthetic, implant pack for implants and speculums, forceps, and 
tenaculum for IUDs), as measured by the question “Does this facility have the following supplies needed 
to insert and/or remove implants/IUD?”. Moreover, a facility needs to have the LARC or SARC method 
in stock on the day of the survey, regardless of whether this is based on interviewers’ observation or 
providers’ response. Second, a LARC or SARC method was provided free of charge if a facility did not 
charge any consultation fee or method-specific fee. This is assessed by two questions – “Do family 
planning clients need to pay any fees in order to be seen by a provider even if they do not obtain a method 
of contraception” and “are clients charged for obtaining any of the following methods at this facility?”.  
Outcome variables. The three outcome variables are based on questions included in the Female 
Questionnaire for women of reproductive age. Use of modern contraceptives is measured by the pre-
coded binary “modern contraceptive user” variable that indicates current use of a modern family planning 
method. Use of LARC is a binary variable coded to 1 if the response to current use of either implant or 
 46 
IUD is yes. Contraceptive method choice is measured based on the question “during that visit, who made 
the final decision about what method you got?” and is coded to 1 if the answer is respondent alone, 
respondent and provider, or respondent and partner.  
Covariates. The Female Questionnaire has a wide range of individual-level covariates. These include 
women’s socio-demographic characteristics (e.g., age, education, marital status, rurality, and wealth), 
sexual and reproductive history (e.g., age of first sex, age of first birth), fertility preference (e.g., when to 
have another child), knowledge about different family planning methods (e.g., ever heard of a specific 
method), and sources for family planning information (e.g., read about family planning in newspaper). 
Using a principle component analysis approach, we constructed two indices based on all knowledge or 
information source variables, with higher scores indicating women’s greater knowledge of different 
contraceptive methods or exposure to various information sources about family planning.  
3.3.2 Statistical analyses 
The study’s main hypothesis is that free access to a broad contraceptive method mix is associated 
with women’s greater overall contraceptive use, LARC use, and autonomy in decision-making. We used 
the propensity score approach because differences between individuals who live in communities with 
good access to family planning services and those that do not might affect contraceptive use and women’s 
agency. For example, women who prioritize health might live closer to well-funded facilities and are 
more likely to use effective modern contraceptives. Conventional propensity score methods reduce 
confounding by accounting for observed characteristics that predict treatment and often apply propensity 
weights in treatment effect models.132,133 However, such propensity score models assume comparability of 
unobserved pre-treatment characteristics between groups, are likely to be misspecified, and might omit 
covariates that are important to treatment selection.134–136  
To strengthen the propensity score approach, we used generalized boosted modeling (GBM) to 
estimate propensity scores. GBM is a non-parametric machine learning technique that adds together a 
collection of simple regression tree models to fit a nonlinear surface and is effective in producing 
probability estimates with a large number of covariates.136,137 Similar machine learning algorithms have 
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increasingly been applied in health and medical studies.138,139 GBM is particularly tuned to produce well-
calibrated probability estimates and has been shown to outperform standard logistic regression and 
covariate balancing propensity methods in complex models for non-linear relationships.136,140  
The propensity score approach consists of two steps. First, we used GBM to estimate probability of 
having free access using all available covariates at the individual level (Table A6). The algorithm was 
stopped at the number of iterations that minimized the average standardized absolute mean difference in 
the covariates. A dummy missing variable approach was used to create a missing category for all factor 
variables so that the algorithms would use the missingness in the predictions.  
Then, weights generated from the GBM propensity scores were applied to the logistic regression 
model specified below: 
!"#= = & + (>..+??#=$ + @= + A"#=′2 + 3"#= 
where Yijc is the outcome of interest for individual i of community j in country c, Accessi is a dummy 
equal to one if the community provides access to both LARC and SARC free of charge, zc is a full set of 
country fixed effects to control for time-invariant country characteristics, and Xijc is a vector of individual 
characteristics including age (continuous variable), education (categorical variable for highest level of 
school attended), marital status (categorical variable), rurality (binary variable), household wealth index 
quintile (categorical variable), family planning knowledge score (continuous variable), family planning 
information exposure score (continuous variable), fertility preference (binary variable), and provider type 
(categorical variable for LARC use and decision-model only). The coefficient of interest is (, which 
represents the estimated effects of free access to LARC and SARC. The results are presented as average 
marginal effects. 
In addition to the primary models, we conducted additional sensitivity and subgroup analyses. First, 
we used standard logistic regression models to generate propensity scores and compared the results with 
the GBM-based models. Second, to examine whether the price effects vary by contraceptive type, we 
assessed the effects of free access to both LARC and SARC as well as free access to only SARC on 
method-specific use. Third, we used an alternative definition for the treatment variable and examined the 
 48 
effects of access to contraceptives without removing user fees. Specifically, we used multinomial logit 
models to generate propensity scores for a categorical treatment variable with three levels: no access, 
access with some fee, and free access. Lastly, to examine heterogeneity in the effects of free access 
among subgroups of women, we draw on the recursive partitioning approach used in previous empirical 
work.141–143 We first split the data into two randomly chosen sub-samples, one sample to identify the 
sources of heterogeneity (training subsample) and the other to estimate the treatment effects and 
confidence intervals (estimation subsample). The machine learning algorithm created a decision tree that 
aimed to correctly classify individuals’ outcome status by splitting the training subsample into high-
dimensional and mutually exclusive groups. Based on the structure of the decision tree and the variable 
important measure, we identified the subgroups and estimated heterogeneous treatment effects using the 
estimation subsample.  
Statistical tests were 2-sided and the statistical significance was set at p<.05. Analyses were 
performed using R v3.5.1 (the R Foundation, packages “rpart” and “twang”)144,145 and Stata, version 15.1 
(StataCorp LLC). 
3.4 Results 
The full sample contained 29,833 individuals, of which 15,998 (53.6%) had free access to a broad 
contraceptive method mix and the remaining 13,835 (46.4%) did not. Overall, 28.8% of individuals were 
using a modern contraceptive method. Among these contraceptive users, 29.4% were using LARC and 
91.2% reported having participated in the decisions about which method to use. Unweighted, 32.5% of 
women with free access to both LARC and SARC were using a modern contraceptive method compared 
to 24.4% among those without access. The proportion of LARC users did not differ by access status while 
more women with free access participated in contraceptive decision-making (93.3% vs. 87.8%). Most 
other covariates differed by treatment status (see Table 7 for the unweighted descriptive statistics).  
We used the machine learning algorithm GBM and all variables listed in Table A6 to generate 
propensity weights, including missing values as dummy variables. Weighted standardized differences in 
covariates between treatment and comparison groups were reduced to below .03 on average and 
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below .06 in all variables except for one country. For comparison purposes, we also used the standard 
logistic regression approach to generate propensity weights, including a limited set of covariates. A 
comparison on covariate balance between the GBM approach and the logistic regression approach were 
presented in Figure A1. The distribution of propensity scores generated from GBM was presented in 
Figure A2. 
The main results are presented in Table 8. We applied the propensity weights built from GBM, our 
preferred approach, and the weights from logistic regression models to the main specification and 
presented average marginal effects. Free access to a broad contraceptive mix was associated with an 
increase of 3.2 percentage points (95% confidence interval [CI]: 0.006 – 0.058) in the likelihood of 
contraceptive use among all women, representing an increase of 13.1% from the 24.4% contraceptive use 
in the control group. Among current contraceptive users, free access had no effect on LARC use or 
women’s role in contraceptive method decision-making. The specifications using propensity weights from 
logistic regression models produced similar effects except for the LARC use outcome: free access was 
associated with a decrease of 3.8 percentage points (95% CI: -0.075 – -0.000) in the likelihood of LARC 
use.  
To further investigate the price effects on contraceptive use, we estimated the effects of free access to 
different types of contraceptives on women’s contraceptive use by method-type (Table 9). Table A7 
shows that 77.7% of all women and 84.0% of current contraceptive users who had free access to SARC 
also had free access to LARC. 
Panel A of Table 9 shows that free access to both LARC and SARC was associated with an increase 
in overall contraceptive use as well as an increase of 2.5 percentage points in SARC use (95% CI: 0.003 – 
0.047) but had no effect on LARC use. Free access to SARC only was associated with an increase of 4.1 
percentage points (95% CI: 0.007 – 0.074) in overall contraceptive use and had no effect on LARC use. 
Although free access to SARC was not associated with any statistically significant effect on SARC use, 
the effect size is similar to that of free access to both LARC and SARC with a p-value of 0.079. These 
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results suggest that LARC use was not responsive to the removal of user fees, or at least not as sensitive 
as SARC use.  
Turning to women who were contraceptive users, Panel B of Table 9 shows that neither free access to 
both LARC and SARC nor free access to SARC alone was associated with any statistically significant 
effect on method-specific use. This indicates that among women who were already using a modern 
contraceptive method, removing user fees did not shift their preference for contraceptives defined by the 
two general contraceptive types.  
Using an alternative definition of the treatment variable, Table 10 assesses the effects of access to 
contraceptives with and without user fees. Among all women, access alone without removing user fees 
did not affect contraceptive use. By comparison, free access was associated with an increase of 4.7 
percentage points in contraceptive use (95% CI: 0.019 – 0.074), which underscores the importance of 
removing financial barriers in addition to making family planning services available. Among 
contraceptive users, neither access alone nor free access affected LARC use or decision-making.  
Heterogeneity. We draw on the machine learning recursive partitioning approach to identify 
subgroups that best predict modern contraceptive use.141–143 The machine learning algorithm tried to 
predict which distinct groups of women would use modern contraceptives based on a list of observed 
characteristics. The training sub-sample used in the exercise was a randomly generated half sample of the 
full dataset. The other half sub-sample was used in estimating treatment effects. This “honest” approach 
helps to avoid identifying spurious relationships by overfitting the model.141–143 The decision tree 
generated by the training sub-sample correctly classified contraceptive use for 76.5% of the observations 
in the estimation sub-sample.  
In the final tree structure (see Figure A3), the candidates for the primary splits for the first node 
include marital status, family planning knowledge, and age. These variables are also the three highest 
ranked variables according to the variable importance measure (see Table A8), which indicates how much 
a model uses a given variable to make accurate predictions. We also included education and wealth as 
potential source of heterogeneity based on the literature and the fact that they had higher or similar 
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variable importance values compared to the treatment variable. We used the splitting rules as cutoff 
values to create subgroups in the estimation sub-sample.   
Free access to a broad contraceptive method mix was associated with greater contraceptive use 
among older women who were at least 20 years of age (see Table 11 Panel B). By comparison, 
adolescents used contraceptives less when LARC and SARC were offered for free. Free access also had 
greater effects on overall contraceptive use among women who were relatively knowledgeable about 
family planning, had at least some schooling, and came from an above-the-lowest wealth quintile, 
although the result on wealth was not statistically significant (p = 0.061). For current contraceptive users, 
free access was associated with a 9.9 percentage point decrease (95% CI: -0.194 – -0.003) in LARC use 
among women who came from the lowest wealth quintile, although we could not reject this is different 
from the effect among women from a wealthier background. The effects on LARC use and decision-
making did not differ in any of the other subgroups we examined.  
3.5 Discussion 
Free access to a broad contraceptive method mix may enhance women’s agency in family planning, 
but existing literature is lacking on whether removing user fees is an effective approach to increase 
women’s contraceptive use and autonomy in low-resource settings. Linking facility and individual-level 
data from eight countries in SSA, this study suggests that free access was associated with a modest 
increase in overall contraceptive use, did not prompt current users to switch contraceptive types, and did 
not seem to reach the most vulnerable women that need access to services the most.  
The results showed that free access to both LARC and SARC was associated with 13% increase in 
modern contraceptive use, indicating that demand for contraceptives is sensitive to price in contexts with 
limited resources, in line with recent field studies.58,146,147 In addition, the increase in contraceptive use 
was only observed when contraceptives were provided free of charge, indicating that only making family 
planning services available to women without removing cost barriers would not increase women’s 
contraceptive use. However, this is a modest effect as it only represents an increase of contraceptive use 
from 24.4% to 27.3% among women who had no immediate plan to have a child. The lack of stronger 
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effect might be explained by frequent stockout of contraceptive commodities in this setting,148,149 which 
can prompt providers to prioritize women who are older, married, and with children.150 The finding that 
the price effect was driven by an increase in SARC use might reflect women’s preference for short-term 
methods because of their convenience, privacy, and fewer side effects compared to LARC as well as the 
ability to discontinue SARC without assistance from a willing and skilled provider.112,151,152 Moreover, by 
definition, free access to SARC indicated that a facility does not charge any consultation fee for family 
planning visits. Consultation fees can be an important access barrier in addition to method-specific 
charges and can add up as women need more frequent visits for short-term methods.114 These findings 
suggest that removing user fees alone might not have a transformative impact on contraceptive uptake. On 
the other hand, when resources are limited, partial subsidies that target the methods women prefer could 
increase overall contraceptive use. 
The finding that free access was not associated with an increase in LARC use suggests that other 
factors might have played a larger role in LARC use than financial barriers. A recent review suggests that 
different promotion strategies, including vouchers, could raise uptake of IUDs, but such effects did not 
translate into any impact at the national level due to providers’ preference for methods that take less time 
and women’s discomfort with having an IUD insertion in facilities that lack the space for privacy or by a 
male doctor.153 In addition, some countries have policies that restrict the use of IUDs by unmarried 
women or adolescents, further limiting access to LARC for certain subgroups.154 Even when LARC are 
provided for free, women might not want to use them due to the concern for removal, reliance on health 
providers, and less familiarity through social network.112,155 Addressing these supply- and demand-side 
factors may have a larger effect on LARC use than relying on pricing strategies alone.  
Additionally, among women from the poorest households, free access was associated with decreased 
LARC use, indicating that women who were using LARC switched to non-LARC methods when LARC 
were offered for free. While we need more detailed information on women’s preferences and access to 
understand this switching pattern, we offer one potential explanation: the treatment variable free access is 
defined as having free access to at least one method under two general categories of contraceptive 
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method-types (i.e., LARC and SARC), which does not measure accurately whether a woman has free 
access to her preferred methods. For example, injectables, a short-term method, are the most popular 
contraceptive in SSA.156 In Kenya, all public sector users were supposed to receive contraceptives for 
free, but users of injectables were more likely to pay compared to users of implants, IUDs, pills, or 
condoms, indicating women’s strong preference for injectables.157 If free access to LARC and SARC 
reflected more resources to cover LARC and some previously not-covered SARC methods, such as 
injectables, LARC users might switch to injectables when LARC were provided free of charge as defined 
by the treatment variable. Given the wide differences in women’s preferences for contraceptive 
methods,156 more detailed analysis is needed to examine whether women’s preferences and access align 
and how price affects demand for different contraceptive methods in specific contexts.     
Older women, women who were more educated or more informed about contraceptive methods, and 
women from wealthier economic background were more likely to use contraceptives when LARC were 
offered for free. By comparison, women from more disadvantaged backgrounds might face more non-
financial barriers that limit their contraceptive use, such as low health literacy, provider bias, and time 
costs.112 In particular, free access was associated with lower contraceptive use among adolescents. One 
explanation is that adolescents might be less likely to receive services from public facilities where 
contraceptives are provided free of charge but providers are reluctant to offer them to young unmarried 
women due to personal biases.112,150 In the analysis dataset, non-public facilities rarely offer both LARC 
and SARC for free (see Table A9) and there is a moderate negative correlation between age (under 20) 
and visiting public-sector provider for the most recent family planning method (r = -0.213, p < 0.001), 
suggesting that adolescents were less likely to obtain contraceptives from public facilities where youth-
friendly services are often lacking. Thus, the association between free access and lower contraceptive use 
among teenagers might indicate that other factors, such as provider bias, are more prominent barriers for 
young women’s access to contraceptive services. This is alarming as young women are less able to afford 
user fees and more susceptible to the negative consequences of unintended pregnancies, such as worse 
maternal and infant health outcomes, compromised educational prospects, and fewer economic 
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opportunities.93,94 To provide better access to contraceptives for all women, especially those who are most 
vulnerable and in need of family planning services, more research is needed to examine the barriers these 
women face and test the effectiveness of other interventions combined with financial subsidies, which 
include but are not limited to targeted information campaigns, community-based distribution strategies, 
and trainings that address provider biases.  
Removing cost barriers did not enhance women’s role in contraceptive decision-making based on 
women’s response to a single standardized survey question. This might not be a surprise as 91% of 
women who were current contraceptive users in the dataset participated in contraceptive method 
decisions, leaving relatively little space to improve. In addition, this specific survey question might not 
capture the complex decision-making process or reflect women’s agency in whether or not to use any 
contraceptive. Nevertheless, this finding suggests that removing costs alone is unlikely to have any large 
effect on women’s autonomy in contraceptive method decisions for those already using family planning 
services.   
This study has several limitations. First, the main treatment variable free access is defined based on 
the charges reported in the Service Delivery Points Questionnaire, which might not be an accurate 
measure due to informal fees.114 We used data from the Female Questionnaire to validate facility-reported 
contraceptive charges. Specifically, women were asked whether they paid any fees for family planning 
services in the past 12 months. There was a negative correlation between user-reported fees for 
contraceptives and free access defined by facility surveys, r = -.19 (p < .001), providing some assurance 
for the validity of the treatment variable. Second, women who live in a community where contraceptives 
are available free of charge might still have limited access due to travel and time costs, especially since 
public facilities can be located outside of the communities they serve. Women might also be denied free 
services due to provider biases based on age, parity, or marital status.150 On the other hand, while some 
women might travel to obtain free family planning services outside of their communities, others might 
prefer to visit a facility that is farther away for privacy or better quality of care. Future studies could use 
detailed service utilization data to examine the importance of costs relative to other barriers for women’s 
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contraceptive uptake. Third, contraceptive stockout is usually high in the study settings but was not 
common based on the data from the Service Delivery Points surveys.148,149 For example, among facilities 
that routinely provided implants and IUDs, about 90% had them in stock and this was verified by 
enumerators on the day of the survey. Although the Family Planning 2020 Initiative might have brought 
more resources and strengthened supply chain systems in these countries, it is still likely that data from 
these facility surveys might not capture whether women had routine access to family planning services. 
Thus, women who did not have free access might have been misclassified in our analyses, which would 
underestimate the treatment effects. Fourth, this study pooled data from eight countries in SSA that have 
pledged to the Family Planning 2020 Initiative to estimate the association between access and 
contraceptive use in this region. However, these eight countries vary greatly among themselves, as 
indicated by the contraceptive prevalence rates in our data, and our analyses did not provide country-
specific estimates. Meanwhile, these eight countries might not be representative of all countries in SSA, 
limiting the generalizability of the study findings. For example, these countries might have higher 
government commitment to financing family planning services, lower contraceptive prevalence before the 
Initiative, or different social norms about the use of LARC versus short-term methods. Lastly, unobserved 
factors could have confounded the estimated associations between free access and contraceptive use. 
Future studies that randomly assign treatment status would provide stronger evidence on the effects of 
price on contraceptive use.   
3.6 Conclusions 
Free access to a broad contraceptive method mix was associated with a modest increase in 
contraceptive use, driven by higher use of short-term methods, based on data from eight countries in SSA. 
Among current contraceptive users, free access to LARC did not prompt more women to switch to LARC 
and had no effect on women’s autonomy in contraceptive decision-making. Governments and 
international donors should continue using financial subsidies to accelerate contraceptive uptake, but 
removing user fees alone does not necessarily increase access or choice, especially for women from more 
disadvantaged segments of the population who need family planning services the most.   
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TABLE 7. Descriptive statistics 
Variable All Treat Comparison p-value 
N 29833 15998 13835  
Modern contraceptive user 8579 (28.8%) 5207 (32.5%) 3372 (24.4%) <0.001 
   Use of LARC 2520 (29.4%) 1522 (29.2%) 998 (29.6%) 0.72 
   Decided contraceptive method 7820 (91.2%) 4860 (93.3%) 2960 (87.8%) <0.001 
Age, mean (SD) 28.0 (9.3) 27.9 (9.3) 28.0 (9.3) 0.42 
Urban 13744 (46.1%) 6920 (43.3%) 6824 (49.3%) <0.001 
Highest level of education    <0.001 
   never attended 7224 (24.2%) 3043 (19.0%) 4181 (30.2%)  
   primary/middle school 10232 (34.3%) 6122 (38.3%) 4110 (29.7%)  
   secondary/post-primary 9486 (31.8%) 5097 (31.9%) 4389 (31.7%)  
   tertiary/post-secondary 2891 (9.7%) 1736 (10.9%) 1155 (8.3%)  
Marital status    <0.001 
   never married 9971 (33.4%) 5352 (33.5%) 4619 (33.4%)  
   currently married 15200 (51.0%) 8096 (50.6%) 7104 (51.3%)  
   currently living with partner 2178 (7.3%) 1000 (6.3%) 1178 (8.5%)  
   divorced or separated 1666 (5.6%) 1085 (6.8%) 581 (4.2%)  
   widow or widower 818 (2.7%) 465 (2.9%) 353 (2.6%)  
Married once or more than once    0.22 
   never 9971 (33.5%) 5352 (33.5%) 4619 (33.5%)  
   once 17484 (58.7%) 9348 (58.5%) 8136 (59.0%)  
   more than once 2311 (7.8%) 1280 (8.0%) 1031 (7.5%)  
Partner has other wives 4655 (27.1%) 2088 (23.3%) 2567 (31.3%) <0.001 
Wealth score quintile    <0.001 
   lowest quintile 6048 (20.3%) 3062 (19.1%) 2986 (21.6%)  
   lower quintile 5851 (19.6%) 3020 (18.9%) 2831 (20.5%)  
   middle quintile 5530 (18.5%) 2902 (18.1%) 2628 (19.0%)  
   higher quintile 5503 (18.4%) 2929 (18.3%) 2574 (18.6%)  
   highest quintile 6901 (23.1%) 4085 (25.5%) 2816 (20.4%)  
Ever given birth 20059 (67.3%) 10678 (66.8%) 9381 (67.8%) 0.050 
Age at first sex, median (IQR) 17.0 (15.0, 19.0) 17.0 (15.0, 19.0) 17.0 (15.0, 19.0) 0.054 
Age at first birth, mean (SD) 19.9 (4.2) 19.9 (4.1) 20.0 (4.3) 0.28 
Prefer no more children 7768 (26.0%) 4484 (28.0%) 3284 (23.7%) <0.001 
Months to wait before another child, mean (SD) 48.3 (38.9) 50.8 (39.7) 45.6 (37.9) <0.001 
Family planning knowledge score, mean (SD) 0.0 (2.1) 0.2 (2.1) -0.2 (2.2) <0.001 
Family planning information exposure, mean (SD) 0.0 (1.4) 0.0 (1.4) -0.0 (1.3) <0.001 
Country    <0.001 
   Burkina Faso 2650 (8.9%) 67 (0.4%) 2583 (18.7%)  
   Ethiopia 5617 (18.8%) 4711 (29.4%) 906 (6.5%)  
   Ghana 2427 (8.1%) 35 (0.2%) 2392 (17.3%)  
   Kenya 4801 (16.1%) 4281 (26.8%) 520 (3.8%)  
   Niger 1830 (6.1%) 1339 (8.4%) 491 (3.5%)  
   Nigeria 7425 (24.9%) 2794 (17.5%) 4631 (33.5%)  
   Uganda 3234 (10.8%) 2674 (16.7%) 560 (4.0%)  
   Cote d'Ivoire 1849 (6.2%) 97 (0.6%) 1752 (12.7%)  
* The analysis dataset excludes pregnant women and women who would like to have another child soon.  
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TABLE 8. Effects of free access to a broad contraceptive method mix  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Women Current Contraceptive Users 
 Modern Contraceptive Use LARC Use Decision-Making 
 GBM Logit GBM Logit GBM Logit 
Treat (free access) 0.032* 0.029* -0.029 -0.038* 0.013 0.012 
 [0.006,0.058] [0.002,0.055] [-0.066,0.007] [-0.075,-0.000] [-0.021,0.047] [-0.021,0.045] 
Age 0.003 0.010 -0.008 -0.005 0.018 0.022 
 [-0.022,0.028] [-0.016,0.036] [-0.048,0.033] [-0.047,0.037] [-0.013,0.049] [-0.010,0.053] 
Urban -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.000 0.000 0.002** 0.002** 
 [-0.003,-0.001] [-0.003,-0.001] [-0.003,0.003] [-0.003,0.004] [0.001,0.004] [0.001,0.004] 
Education (base = no schooling) 
Primary school 0.047*** 0.032* 0.011 0.014 -0.010 -0.012 
 [0.026,0.069] [0.003,0.061] [-0.025,0.047] [-0.025,0.053] [-0.041,0.021] [-0.043,0.018] 
Secondary school 0.048** 0.030 -0.033 -0.022 0.012 0.012 
 [0.018,0.078] [-0.006,0.067] [-0.076,0.011] [-0.063,0.020] [-0.016,0.040] [-0.016,0.039] 
Tertiary school 0.045** 0.025 0.019 0.025 0.000 0.001 
 [0.011,0.079] [-0.017,0.066] [-0.039,0.077] [-0.039,0.089] [-0.036,0.036] [-0.035,0.036] 
Marital status (base = never married) 
Married 0.270*** 0.257*** 0.084** 0.087** 0.029 0.029 
 [0.240,0.299] [0.224,0.290] [0.023,0.146] [0.029,0.144] [-0.015,0.072] [-0.015,0.072] 
Cohabiting 0.243*** 0.239*** 0.060 0.074 0.060* 0.063* 
 [0.205,0.280] [0.200,0.279] [-0.010,0.130] [-0.003,0.151] [0.004,0.117] [0.004,0.122] 
Divorced or separated 0.108*** 0.095*** 0.159*** 0.158*** 0.094*** 0.094*** 
 [0.073,0.143] [0.055,0.134] [0.076,0.241] [0.077,0.240] [0.050,0.138] [0.049,0.138] 
Widow -0.006 -0.019 0.053 0.089 0.055 0.056 
 [-0.042,0.030] [-0.057,0.018] [-0.065,0.171] [-0.049,0.226] [-0.012,0.121] [-0.010,0.121] 
Wealth index quintile (base = lowest) 
Lower quintile 0.059*** 0.064*** -0.046* -0.033 -0.033 -0.035 
 [0.033,0.084] [0.037,0.091] [-0.089,-0.003] [-0.075,0.010] [-0.076,0.011] [-0.074,0.004] 
Middle quintile 0.052*** 0.050** -0.052* -0.042 -0.023 -0.030* 
 [0.021,0.083] [0.018,0.083] [-0.102,-0.002] [-0.094,0.010] [-0.055,0.009] [-0.060,-0.000] 
Higher quintile 0.093*** 0.097*** -0.036 -0.033 -0.053* -0.060** 
 [0.057,0.129] [0.059,0.134] [-0.087,0.014] [-0.086,0.020] [-0.096,-0.010] [-0.104,-0.017] 
Highest quintile 0.078*** 0.081*** 0.020 0.025 -0.019 -0.028 
 [0.045,0.112] [0.046,0.116] [-0.039,0.079] [-0.036,0.087] [-0.054,0.016] [-0.062,0.006] 
Family planning knowledge 
score 
0.051*** 0.054*** 0.019** 0.016* 0.006 0.006 
 [0.045,0.058] [0.047,0.061] [0.007,0.030] [0.004,0.028] [-0.002,0.015] [-0.002,0.015] 
Family planning information 0.006 0.006 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 [-0.000,0.013] [-0.000,0.013] [-0.012,0.010] [-0.011,0.011] [-0.010,0.007] [-0.010,0.007] 
Fertility preference (base = prefer more children) 
Prefer no more child 0.017 0.014 0.032* 0.034* -0.015 -0.011 
 [-0.004,0.038] [-0.007,0.034] [0.003,0.061] [0.005,0.064] [-0.036,0.006] [-0.033,0.010] 
Family planning provider (base = public sector) 
private sector -- -- -0.290*** -0.281*** -0.033* -0.031* 
   [-0.317,-0.263] [-0.309,-0.252] [-0.062,-0.004] [-0.059,-0.002] 
NGO -- -- 0.083 0.085 -0.057 -0.059 
   [-0.094,0.260] [-0.089,0.260] [-0.177,0.064] [-0.178,0.061] 
other -- -- -0.347*** -0.348*** -0.072* -0.087* 
   [-0.385,-0.308] [-0.385,-0.311] [-0.137,-0.008] [-0.162,-0.012] 
Number of observations 29833 29833 8464 8464 8464 8464 
Control mean 0.244 0.244 0.303 0.303 0.890 0.890 
95% confidence intervals in brackets  
LARC: long-acting reversible contraceptives, including implants and intrauterine devices. Decision-making: whether respondent participated in 
the decision on contraceptive method. Logistic regression models report average marginal effects and include country fixed effects. Propensity 
weights generated from generalized boosted models (GBM) or logistic models were applied to adjust for observed differences by treatment status. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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TABLE 9: Effects of free access on contraceptive use by method type 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Modern Contraceptive 
Use 
LARC Use SARC Use 
Panel A: among all women 
Free access to both LARC & SARC 0.032* 0.003 0.025* 
 [0.006,0.058] [-0.010,0.016] [0.003,0.047] 
Control mean 0.244 0.072 0.170 
Free access to SARC only 0.041* 0.016 0.023 
 [0.007,0.074] [-0.000,0.031] [-0.003,0.049] 
Control mean 0.258 0.081 0.175 
Number of observations 29833 29833 29833 
Panel B: among current contraceptive users 
Free access to both LARC & SARC -- -0.026 0.015 
  [-0.066,0.013] [-0.027,0.056] 
Control mean -- 0.296 0.697 
Free access to SARC only -- 0.014 -0.020 
  [-0.030,0.058] [-0.065,0.025] 
Control mean -- 0.314 0.679 
Number of observations -- 8579 8579 
95% confidence intervals in brackets 
Logistic regression models report average marginal effects and include country fixed effects. Propensity weights 
generated from generalized boosted models were applied to adjust for observed differences by treatment status. 
LARC: long-acting reversible contraceptives, including implants and intrauterine devices. SARC: short-acting 
reversible contraceptives.  






TABLE 10. Effects of access and free access to a broad contraceptive method mix  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All women Current contraceptive users 
 Modern Contraceptive Use LARC Use Decision-Making 
Access to both LARC and SARC 0.021 0.055 0.014 
 [-0.007,0.049] [-0.007,0.116] [-0.020,0.049] 
Free access to both LARC and SARC 0.047** 0.004 0.014 
 [0.019,0.074] [-0.055,0.062] [-0.020,0.047] 
p-value 0.004 0.027 0.663 
Control mean 0.252 0.282 0.906 
Number of observations 29802 8462 8462 
95% confidence intervals in brackets 
LARC: long-acting reversible contraceptives, including implants and intrauterine devices. SARC: short-acting reversible 
contraceptives. Decision-making: whether respondent participated in the decision on contraceptive method. Propensity weights 
generated from multinomial logistic models were applied to adjust for observed differences by treatment status. The p-value row 
reports the two-sided p-value from an F-test of equality of the treatment effects of access and free access.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
  
 60 
TABLE 11. Effects of free access to a broad contraceptive method mix among key sub-groups 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All women Current contraceptive users 
 Modern Contraceptive Use LARC Use Decision-Making 
Panel A: Heterogeneity by marital status 
   Treat × Marstat1 (married, cohabiting, & divorced) 0.028 -0.016 0.034 
 [-0.002,0.059] [-0.059,0.028] [-0.011,0.080] 
   Treat × Marstat0 (never married & widow) 0.055* -0.112 -0.016 
 [0.001,0.108] [-0.235,0.011] [-0.091,0.059] 
   p-value 0.428 0.120 0.247 
Panel B: Heterogeneity by age 
   Treat × Older (age > 19.5) 0.066*** -0.025 0.025 
 [0.038,0.094] [-0.068,0.019] [-0.017,0.067] 
   Treat × Younger (age < 19.5) -0.183*** -0.079 -0.004 
 [-0.238,-0.128] [-0.169,0.011] [-0.069,0.062] 
   p-value 0.000 0.195 0.275 
Panel C: Heterogeneity by knowledge 
   Treat × High (knowledge score > -1.14) 0.042*** -0.025 0.019 
 [0.020,0.065] [-0.070,0.020] [-0.028,0.066] 
   Treat × Low (knowledge score < -1.14) -0.043 -0.022 0.019 
 [-0.118,0.033] [-0.133,0.088] [-0.045,0.082] 
   p-value 0.029 0.967 0.997 
Panel D: Heterogeneity by education 
   Treat × Edu1 (at least some schooling)  0.043*** -0.026 0.022 
 [0.021,0.065] [-0.073,0.021] [-0.027,0.072] 
   Treat × Edu0 (no schooling) -0.047 -0.048 0.009 
 [-0.109,0.015] [-0.140,0.044] [-0.057,0.075] 
   p-value 0.000 0.371 0.670 
Panel E: Heterogeneity by wealth 
   Treat × Wealth1 (above lowest quintile) 0.029* -0.022 0.027 
 [0.005,0.054] [-0.067,0.023] [-0.021,0.075] 
   Treat × Wealth0 (lowest quintile) 0.003 -0.099* -0.038 
 [-0.064,0.071] [-0.194,-0.003] [-0.099,0.023] 
   p-value 0.061 0.115 0.171 
Number of observations 14917 4229 4229 
95% confidence intervals in brackets 
LARC: long-acting reversible contraceptives, including implants and intrauterine devices. Decision-making: whether respondent 
participated in the decision on contraceptive method. This table reports the average marginal effects of the treatment (free access 
to a broad contraceptive method mix) on subgroups of women indicated in each panel. The subgroups were identified by a 
recursive partitioning machine learning analysis. A random half of the full data were used to identify the source of heterogeneity 
and the other half were used to estimate treatment effects reported in this table. Logistic regression models included individual 
covariates and country fixed effects. Propensity weights generated from generalized boosted models were used to adjust for 
observed differences by treatment status. The p-value rows report the two-sided p-value from an F-test of equality of the 
treatment effects for the two sub-groups indicated in each panel.  









CHAPTER 4: EFFECTS OF DISCLOSING HIV-NEGATIVE STATUS ON SEXUAL 
RELATIONSHIPS AMONG WOMEN WITH MULTIPLE SEXUAL PARTNERS IN KENYA 
 
4.1 Overview 
Background: Women with multiple sexual partners who often engage in transactional sex are at 
increased risk of HIV infection, economic hardship, and relationship abuse in a generalized HIV 
epidemic. Disclosing HIV-negative status to sexual partners may influence relationship stability, allow 
women to negotiate higher prices in transactional sex, and facilitate safer sexual behaviors. However, 
such a strategy might not increase women’s agency in sexual relationships due to gender-based power 
dynamics. 
Methods: This paper uses an instrumental variable approach to assess how disclosing HIV-negative 
status affects intimate partner and transactional sex relationships for women with multiple partners in 
Kenya. We conduct a secondary analysis of data collected at baseline, 6-month, and 12-month surveys 
from a randomized controlled trial and use intervention assignment to instrument HIV-status disclosure. 
We also assess whether the effects differed between sex workers and non-sex workers. 
Results:  Disclosing HIV-negative status reduced the likelihood of ending any sexual relationship by 
27.5 percentage points (95% confidence interval [CI]: -0.494 – -0.056), almost eliminating the possibility 
of any relationship dissolution. Disclosure increased the price for unprotected transactional sex by 80% at 
12 months and increased women’s likelihood of refusing sex after a partner declined to test for HIV or 
tested positive by 18.5 percentage points (95% CI: 0.091 – 0.279) at 6 months. There was no effect on 
number of sexual partners, condom use, or intimate partner violence. HIV-status disclosure had 
differential effects by sex worker status on relationship dissolution, prices for and income from 
transactional sex, and women’s ability to refuse sex. 
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Conclusions: Disclosing HIV-negative status reduced relationship dissolution, increased prices for 
transactional sex, and allowed women to exert greater control over sexual behaviors. While these effects 
might be moderated by women’s bargaining power, our findings suggest that women with multiple sexual 
partners in Kenya used disclosure of HIV-negative status to inform their decisions in sexual relationships. 
4.2 Introduction 
Women who engage in transactional sex are at increased risk of HIV infection due to having multiple 
concurrent partners, inconsistent condom use, and risks of violence, criminalization, and 
marginalization.20,21 Providing women with HIV self-tests, which may encourage women to test regularly 
and to offer self-tests to sexual partners, has been shown to be an effective approach to facilitating safer 
sexual behaviors in sub-Saharan Africa,158–163 assuming HIV test results are disclosed between women 
and their sexual partners. Existing literature on HIV status disclosure has focused on identifying 
interventions for HIV-positive men and women to safely disclose HIV status to their primary sexual 
partners. HIV-positive women in particular face higher risks of violence, relationship dissolution, and 
stigma following disclosure of their HIV status.59–61 However, for women who have multiple sexual 
partners and often engage in transactional sex, disclosing HIV-negative status also has important 
implications for their intimate partner and transactional sex relationships in a generalized HIV epidemic.   
HIV information may influence sexual relationships by allowing women to know their own HIV 
status, empowering women to negotiate condom use, and changing their attitudes towards women’s rights 
in sexual relationships.164–166 A woman might infer her partner’s HIV status, sexual safety, or faithfulness 
from her own HIV-negative status, making her more likely to stay with the same partner.167 As long-term 
health and togetherness are important motivators for women to use HIV self-tests for couples testing,168 a 
woman might disclose her HIV-negative status to a sexual partner to show her care for the partner’s 
health and interest in a committed relationship, which could increase relationship stability. A woman 
might also disclose her HIV-negative status as a strategy to demand her partners’ HIV information; if a 
partner refused to test for HIV or tested HIV-positive, a woman could end the relationship as a strategy to 
reduce her risks of infection and maintain her HIV-negative status.169–171  
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Knowledge and disclosure of one’s HIV-negative status may also help women decide when and with 
whom to have higher-paying but riskier transactional sex. Recent randomized controlled trials (RCTs) 
showed that distributing two HIV self-tests to female sex workers reduced their numbers of clients and 
non-client partners in Zambia but had no impact in Uganda.172,173 By allowing women to test for HIV in a 
time and place of their choice, access to HIV self-tests might have increased women’s sense of control, 
which in turn enhanced their agency in sexual relationships.172,174 Since the price premium for sex without 
a condom can be high,175 e.g., $3 with a condom vs. $10 without in urban Uganda,173 a sex worker could 
disclose her own HIV-negative status to signal safety, charge higher prices for transactional sex, and 
insist on safer sexual acts to maintain HIV-negative status. Based on data from these two RCTs in 
Uganda and Zambia, researchers showed that sex workers’ knowledge of HIV-negative status was 
associated with increased condom use, suggesting that these women forwent higher economic gains to 
reduce their risks of HIV infection.62,63  
Although women might disclose HIV-negative status as a way to select safer sexual partners, such a 
strategy might not enhance women’s agency in sexual relationships due to unequal power dynamics based 
on gender. In Malawi, the relative risk of divorce was three times higher for HIV-positive women 
compared with HIV-negative women, but the adverse effects of HIV infection on marriage did not apply 
to married men.176 Similarly, HIV-positive women in serodiscordant couples were at higher risk of 
divorce or separation than HIV-negative women in serodiscordant couples in Uganda.177 These gendered 
differences indicate that women’s decision-making power in sexual relationships is lower than men, 
potentially due to less stigma towards HIV-positive men, women’s role as caregivers, and women’s 
economic dependence on men.178,179 Thus, women who want to have safer sex or choose safer sexual 
partners might not be able to do so because of the unequal gender dynamics. Moreover, if a woman insists 
on using a condom or refuses to have sex, such conflicts might strain relationships and, in some cases, 
lead to intimate partner violence (IPV).158–160 
HIV status disclosure has potentially important implications for sexual relationships for women who 
engage in transactional sex. Existing literature has focused on HIV-positive women and has not explored 
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the potentially empowering effects of disclosing HIV-negative status on women’s agency in places with a 
generalized HIV epidemic. To illustrate these broader social and economic impacts, this study aims to 
evaluate how disclosing HIV-negative status to sexual partners affects intimate partner and transactional 
sex relationships among women with multiple sexual partners in Kenya.  
4.3 Methods 
Using data from an RCT and an instrumental variable (IV) approach, we assessed the effects of 
disclosing HIV-negative status on intimate partner relationships, transactional sex prices, condom use, 
and agency among women with multiple sexual partners in Kenya. 
4.3.1 Data and sample  
The study data came from a cluster RCT, the Jikinge trial, that examines whether providing multiple 
self-tests to high-risk, HIV-negative women can promote HIV testing in their sexual networks, facilitate 
safer sexual decision-making, and reduce women’s risk of acquiring HIV in the Nyanza region of Kenya 
(ClinicalTrials.gov identifier: NCT03135067). Between June 2017 and August 2018, about 2,090 adult 
women from 66 study clusters who reported having at least two sexual partners within the past four weeks 
were enrolled and randomized into one of the two study arms. In 33 randomly selected intervention 
clusters, participants were offered multiple oral fluid-based HIV self-tests, which provide results in 20 
minutes, and encouraged to offer self-tests to current and potential partners with whom unprotected sex is 
likely. In the remaining 33 comparison clusters, participants were offered multiple referral cards for HIV 
voluntary counseling and testing (VCT) at local testing venues and were encouraged to hand out these 
cards to sexual partners. The intervention period lasted 18 – 24 months. Participants can obtain additional 
HIV self-tests or referral cards on 3-monthly basis. Four follow-up surveys are conducted every six 
months. The main outcomes of the Jikinge trial include HIV incidence, testing uptake, unprotected sex, 
and IPV. The analysis sample for this study consists of data from the baseline, 6-month, and 12-month 
follow-up surveys of the Jikinge trial. Nine individuals (less than 0.5% of the sample) with positive or 




Exposure. The key variables of interest are two binary variables.  First, the treatment assignment 
variable, HIVST, indicates whether a participant was assigned to the HIV self-tests or VCT referral card 
arm at baseline. This variable was used as an instrument in the main analyses. Second, disclosing HIV-
negative status indicates whether a study participant shared her HIV-negative status with her primary 
partner in the past 6 months assessed at either the 6-month or 12-month follow-up surveys. 
Outcome variables. Relationship outcomes include four variables assessed at the 12-month survey. 
Same primary partner indicates whether a participant was with the same primary partner she had at 6 
months. Ended sexual relationship indicates whether a participant had a sexual relationship ended in the 
past 6 months, between 6 and 12 months, either by the participant or a sexual partner. Number of sexual 
partners and number of transactional partners indicate the total number of partners and transactional sex 
partners, respectively, that a participant had in the past month.  
Prices for transactional sex, condom use, and agency indicators were measured at both 6-month and 
12-month follow-up surveys since we expected that HIV-status disclosure might have immediate and 
delayed effects on these outcomes. First, transactional sex prices include charge per sexual encounter 
with or without condom in Kenyan shillings. Total value of sexual transactions in the past month is the 
approximate total value of money, goods, or services a participant received in exchange for sex. Typical 
monthly income was also included as a measure of women’s economic status. Second, condom use 
includes whether a participant used a condom the last time she had sex and whether a participant had 
difficulty negotiating condom use with primary sexual partner in the past month. Third, agency was 
measured by two variables that reflect women’s ability to make choices for themselves. Free from 
intimate partner violence measures whether a participant reported no experiencing any type of physical, 
sexual, and emotional violence in the past 6 months. Declined sex due to a partner’s refusal to test or 
positive result indicates whether a woman declined to have sex with any sexual partner after the partner 
refused to accept an HIV self-test/VCT voucher or after the partner tested HIV-positive in the past 6 
months.   
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4.3.3. Statistical analyses 
The unit of analysis is the study participant. To evaluate the effects of disclosing one’s own HIV 
status, we used a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model to account for potential bias due to self-selected 
disclosure behaviors. We instrumented disclosing HIV-negative status using an ordinary least squares 
regression model in the first stage:  
BC?.:D?+"# = & + 2EFG8)# + .# + 3"#	
where Discloseij is a binary variable indicating if the participant disclosed her HIV-negative status 
following an HIV self-test or facility-based VCT to her primary partner in the past 6 months, HIVSTj is an 
indicator for if the participant belonged to the HIVST study arm, and cj  are study cluster fixed effects. 
Then in the second stage we included the fitted values for Discloseij from the first stage in the regression 
of outcomes on disclosing HIV-negative status:  
!" = & + HBI?.:D?+J " + 3" 	
where Yi is the outcome of interest for participant i at either the 6-month or 12-month follow-up survey 
and BI?.:D?+KJ  is predicted value of disclosing HIV-negative status at the follow-up surveys from the first 
stage regression. The effect, δ, is the estimated local average treatment effect (LATE) using IV, which 
shows the effect among subgroups of women who would disclose their HIV status if assigned to the HIV 
self-test arm but not the VCT arm. Standard errors were clustered at the level of geographic area clusters 
using the cluster-corrected Huber-White estimator. Since we included multiple variables that measure 
conceptually similar outcomes, we used the Romano-Wolf method to account for multiple hypothesis 
testing.180 Specifically, we grouped all variables that measure relationship outcomes and all variables that 
measure transactional prices and income together and used the adjusted p-values in hypothesis testing. 
We assessed the effects of disclosing HIV-negative status at 6 months on relationship outcomes 
measured at 12 months because we expected changes in relationship status would take some time to 
occur. By comparison, since the effects on transactional prices, condom use, and agency were more 
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immediate, we assessed the effects of disclosing HIV-negative status on these outcomes measured at the 
same survey round in addition to the delayed effects.  
The IV approach aims to compare women in the HIV self-test group who disclosed their HIV-
negative status as a result of the treatment and women in the VCT group who would have disclosed their 
HIV status if they had been randomized into the treatment group (i.e., LATE). Three key assumptions 
need to be met for the IV approach to yield unbiased estimator of the LATE.181 First, the relevance 
assumption requires that the instrument, which is the experimental arm assignment, is correlated with 
disclosing HIV-negative status. The first stage regression from the two stage least squares of disclosing 
on intervention assignment yielded F-statistic of 52.5 and 36.5 at 6 months and 12 months respectively. 
These values are greater than the conventional rule of thumb that the F -statistic should be higher than 
10,182 indicating sufficient predictive power of the instrument. Second, the independence assumption 
suggests that the instrument does not share common causes with the relationship outcomes. We expect 
randomization to distribute confounders equally across the two study groups. Third, the exclusion 
restriction suggests that treatment assignment affects outcomes only through participant’s HIV-status 
disclosure. While we could not test this directly, it is possible that the intervention assignment would 
affect women’s relationship dynamics through other mechanisms related to access to HIV self-tests, such 
as women’s knowledge of her own and her partner’s HIV status, subsequent beliefs about partners’ sexual 
behaviors or HIV risks, and partner’s reaction to women’s demand for testing. However, these other 
mechanisms are all closely related to women’s HIV-status disclosure and we discussed these possibilities 
in the discussion section. 
Two other statistical methods were used to estimate average treatment effects (ATE) for binary 
outcomes since 2SLS could produce inconsistent estimates in non-linear models.183 First, the bivariate 
probit (BiProbit) models ran both stages simultaneously and assumed the error terms to be jointly normal. 
The Murphy’s score test was used to check the goodness of fit.184 Second, the two-stage residual-
inclusion (2SRI) models ran the same first stage as 2SLS but used the residuals, instead of the predicted 
values of the treatment, together with the endogenous treatment variable in the second stage.185 Standard 
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errors were bootstrapped with 500 repetitions. Since simulation studies suggested that BiProbit models 
produced less biased estimates than 2SRI,186 results from BiProbit models were reported by default unless 
the assumption for joint normality was violated based on the score test. In principle, both BiProbit and 
2SRI models estimate the effects over the entire population (i.e., ATE) and would produce different 
results from the LATE estimated by 2SLS. 
In addition to the main analyses, we assessed whether the effects of disclosing HIV-negative status 
differed between women who were sex workers and those who were not. Sex workers were defined by 
whether participants reported sex work as their primary or secondary source of income. 2SLS models 
were used to estimate the differential effects among these two subgroups.  
This study is not considered human subject research because there was no interaction with research 
subjects and only de-identified data were used in the analyses. Statistical tests were 2-sided and the 
statistical significance was set at p<.05. Analyses were performed using Stata, version 15.1 (StataCorp 
LLC).  
4.4 Results 
A total of 2087 women were enrolled at the baseline survey (Table 12). Of these 2087 women, 1831 
(87.7%) remained in the sample at the 6-month follow-up survey and 1783 (85.4%) remained at the 12-
month survey. Attrition rates did not vary between study groups (Table 13). At the 6-month survey, 1772 
(96.8%) women had a primary partner and 1822 (99.5%) tested HIV-negative (Table 12). These 1822 
women constituted the full analysis sample.  
Table 14 shows the baseline characteristics of the analysis sample by study arm. Among the 1822 
women in the sample, 66.2% were married, 95.0% had ever exchanged sex for money, and 49.2% 
experienced IPV in the past 12 months. On average these women supported three other people financially, 
had two transactional sex partners in the past month, and earned about US$33 from transactional sex in 
the past month. Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics did not vary by experimental arm at 
baseline.  
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Effects on sexual relationship. At 6 months, 91.3% of participants in the HIV self-test group and 
71.9% of those in the VCT group disclosed their HIV status to sexual partners. Table 15 shows the effects 
of disclosing HIV-negative status at 6 months on relationship outcomes at 12 months. Disclosing HIV-
negative status reduced the likelihood of having ended any sexual relationship in the past 6 months by 
27.5 percentage points (95% confidence interval [CI]: -0.494 – -0.056) based on the 2SLS model, almost 
eliminating the possibility of any relationship dissolution. The BiProbit and 2SRI models produced 
similar effect sizes. Disclosure of HIV status did not have any effect on the likelihood of staying with the 
same primary partner or number of sexual partners.  
Panel A of Table 16 shows that for more than 90% of women who had relationship dissolution in the 
past 6 months, the relationship was ended by women themselves instead of by their sexual partners. In 
addition, about a quarter of these women cited reasons related to HIV testing or positive HIV results for 
relationship dissolution at the 12-month survey. These suggest that women were the decision-makers in 
relationship dissolution and that HIV status information provided to the partners or obtained from the 
partners influenced their decisions. By disclosing her own HIV-negative status, a woman might be more 
assertive in demanding to know her partner’s HIV status, as indicated by a strong correlation between 
women’s own disclosure and her partner’s testing behavior at 6 months (r = 0.545, p < 0.001) and 12 
months (r = 0.613, p < 0.001). Since less than 5% of women had any HIV-positive sexual partners at 12 
months (Panel B of Table 16), sexual relationships might be more stable as women chose to stay longer 
with sexual partners after knowing their HIV-negative status. 
Effects on transactional sex prices. Table 17 shows the immediate and delayed effects of disclosing 
HIV status on transactional sex prices and income. Overall, disclosing HIV-negative status increased the 
price for unprotected sex at 12 months but had no effect on the price for sex with a condom or income. 
Panel B shows that disclosing HIV-negative status at 12 months had an immediate effect and increased 
the price for transactional sex without condom by KES$764.805 (95% CI: 187.165 – 1342.445), which 
was about US$7 and a substantial 80% increase from the control group mean. HIV-negative status might 
have signaled lower risk and higher “safety” to transactional partners and allowed women to charge 
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higher prices for sex without a condom. This effect was only significant at 12 months, perhaps because it 
took some time for women to learn how to use HIV status information in price negotiations. However, 
disclosing HIV-negative status did not raise women’s total income from transactional sex.  
Effects on condom use and agency. Table 18 shows the immediate and delayed effects of disclosing 
HIV status on condom use and agency. Disclosing HIV-negative status did not have any effect on actual 
condom use or women’s ability to negotiate condom use. This suggests that individuals did not stop using 
condoms even with the information that women had relatively low risk of transmitting HIV to their sexual 
partners. In addition, there was no effect on women’s experience of IPV, suggesting that disclosing HIV-
negative status did not put women at greater harm. Meanwhile, disclosing HIV-negative status increased 
women’s likelihood of declining sex after a partner refused to get tested or was tested positive by at least 
18.5 percentage points (95% CI: 0.091 – 0.279), indicating women’s greater agency in sexual behaviors. 
However, this effect was only observed at the 6-month survey.  
Effects by sex worker status. Table 19 shows that disclosing HIV-negative status had differential 
effects among sex workers and non-sex workers on relationship dissolution, prices for and income from 
transactional sex, and agency. Panel A and Panel D suggest that disclosing HIV-negative status reduced 
relationship dissolution and enhanced women’s ability to decline sex only among sex workers. By 
comparison, Panel B shows that the effects on transactional sex prices and income were observed only 
among non-sex workers. In particular, disclosure led to substantial increases in transactional sex prices 
and more than doubled transactional sex income for women who did not consider sex work as their first 
or secondary source of income, although the sample sizes were relatively small.  
4.5 Discussion 
For women with multiple sexual partners who often engage in transactional sex, disclosing their HIV-
negative status has important implications for sexual relationships in a generalized HIV epidemic. Our 
study suggests that disclosing HIV-negative status to sexual partners decreased relationship dissolution, 
increased the price women could charge for transactional sex, and allowed them to decline sex if a partner 
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refused to test for HIV or tested HIV-positive. These findings indicate that HIV status information 
informed women’s decision-making and enhanced their agency in sexual relationships in this setting.  
Our finding shows that disclosing HIV-negative status made sexual relationships more stable for 
women with multiple sexual partners, for which we offer three potential explanations. First, in an HIV 
epidemic, sexual partners’ HIV status and their propensity to engage in risky sexual behaviors is valuable 
in partner selection but often hidden. Thus, women’s disclosure of their HIV-negative status, a desirable 
trait, might make male sexual partners want to stay in a relationship longer. However, women in the study 
had a high level of decision-making power as the majority of them ended sexual relationships themselves, 
making this explanation less plausible. A second explanation is that a woman could infer her sexual 
partners’ HIV status, sexual behaviors, and faithfulness through her own HIV-negative results. This 
would imply that positive perceptions about sexual partners, instead of the disclosure behavior, was the 
reason for decreased relationship dissolution. A third mechanism is that after a woman discloses her own 
HIV-negative status, she might be more assertive in demanding to know a sexual partner’s HIV status and 
could use this information to make informed relationship decisions. HIV self-testing implementation 
studies from Malawi have shown that women felt empowered to offer HIV self-testing kits to their 
partners and that concordant HIV-negative couples reported increased trust and stronger relationships.187 
In addition, individuals could signal their sexual safety to potential partners through repeated HIV testing, 
which accelerated marriage among young unmarried women in Malawi.188 Thus, based on sexual 
partner’s HIV-negative result, women might have decided to stay with a “safe” partner with whom she 
would have broken up without the HIV information. Similar to the second explanation, this suggests that 
women used HIV information to make informed decisions in sexual relationships. The fact that the effect 
was only significant among sex workers provides further support to an agency-based explanation as sex 
workers had greater incentives to maintain relationships with multiple clients.  
The positive effect of HIV-status disclosure on transactional sex prices is important to the economic 
wellbeing of women and their households as women in the dataset provided food, housing, or money to 
three family members on average. Disclosing HIV-negative status allowed women to charge significantly 
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more for unprotected sex, potentially because HIV-negative status signaled greater “quality” of 
transactional sex for clients. However, this effect was only observed at 12 months and disclosure did not 
increase income from transactional sex. In addition, the effect on transactional sex prices was not 
significant among sex workers. By comparison, for women who did not rely on sex work for income and 
mostly worked in sales/services, fishing/trade, and unskilled manual labor, disclosing HIV-negative status 
raised prices for sex with and without condom and more than doubled their income from transactional 
sex. Qualitative research on sex workers in Uganda and South Africa has revealed that while women had 
some agency, the reliance on sex work for livelihood, especially the need to earn money for child care, 
often limits how much women could bargain in transactional sex relationships.189,190 Since the effects of 
HIV-status disclosure on economic agency in transactional sex might be moderated by women’s own 
bargaining power, it might be easier for women who were less dependent on sex work to negotiate higher 
pay for transactional sex.  
It is reassuring that disclosing HIV-negative status did not decrease condom use despite the fact that 
women could charge more for unprotected transactional sex.175 Based on qualitative findings from the 
same setting, sex workers who had access to HIV self-tests told clients that they would agree to have 
unprotected sex only if the clients used self-tests and tested HIV-negative, but these women deliberately 
avoided having unprotected sex with HIV-negative clients by telling them they still had to go for 
confirmatory tests.166 This might be motivated by women’s desire to further reduce risks of HIV infection 
after discovering their own HIV-negative status.167,191 Multiple studies have shown a correlation between 
knowledge of own HIV-negative status and increased condom use among young unmarried women,192 
married women,167 and sex workers.62,63 Our finding contributes to this literature by showing that 
disclosing HIV-negative status to sexual partners did not reduce women’s ability to insist on using 
condoms despite potentially higher economic gains. Meanwhile, we did not find any increase in condom 
use, perhaps because while some women used condoms more often to maintain their HIV-negative status, 
other women chose to have unprotected sex after learning their sexual partners’ HIV-negative status.   
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 The positive effect of HIV-status disclosure on women’s ability to decline sex and the null effect on 
IPV highlight that women in our study could use HIV information to safely make informed choices in 
sexual behaviors. A systematic review suggests that sex workers have limited ability to refuse a client 
who is unwilling to use a condom.175 In our study, sex workers who disclosed her own HIV-negative 
status were able to refuse a client if he did not accept HIV testing or tested HIV-positive. However, this 
strategy to screen out high-risk clients only worked in the first six months of the study, potentially 
because women were able to convince sexual partners to test for HIV and the majority of them were HIV-
negative. Importantly, the evidence did not point to greater risks of IPV as a result of disclosing HIV-
negative status and potentially demanding partners’ HIV information. Although a systematic review 
concluded that HIV self-testing did not increase risk-taking behaviors or harm to women,193 recent 
qualitative research has shown that some women who persuaded their partner to test for HIV reported 
verbal or physical abuse and economic hardship.187 The lack of effect on IPV in this study suggests that 
disclosing HIV-negative status to a sexual partner did not lead to relationship strain that would put 
women at greater harm. This might be because when introducing self-tests to clients, women used various 
strategies to avoid conflict with or physical harm from sexual partners, such as not responding to angry 
partners or forgoing pay, based on qualitative research with sex workers in similar settings.166    
This study has several limitations. First, the results based on the IV approach should be interpreted 
carefully and have limited generalizability. The IV approach precisely estimated the effects of HIV-status 
disclosure among subgroups of women who would disclose their HIV-negative status if assigned to the 
HIV self-tests arm but not to the VCT arm. Thus, if these women had unobserved characteristics that are 
correlated with the outcomes of interest, the findings might not be generalizable to other women. 
However, the estimates based on BiProbit or 2SRI models produced largely similar results, suggesting 
that this subgroup might not be that different from an average woman in the sample. Second, several key 
measures used in the analyses are subject to reporting bias as they rely on self-reported behaviors for 
sensitive topics about sexual relationships, such as HIV-status disclosure, condom use, and IPV. 
Meanwhile, findings on outcomes such as relationship dissolution or transactional prices might suffer less 
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from misreporting. Third, there are considerable missing values in certain outcomes, especially for those 
related to transactional sex prices. For example, if women who did not experience any change in 
transactional sex prices were more likely to skip these questions, the finding we produced would 
overestimate the true impacts of HIV-status disclosure. Fourth, the main exposure variable, disclosure of 
HIV status, was defined based on whether a participant shared her HIV test result with her primary 
partner. However, many outcomes we examined measured sexual relationships with both primary and 
non-primary partners. Although we do not have data on whether participants shared HIV status with non-
primary partners, we expect that women who disclosed HIV status to one partner were more likely to 
share the same information with other sexual partners. Lastly, although the study quantifies the effects of 
HIV-status disclosure, it does not answer how women used HIV information to inform their relationship 
decisions, to what extent women could control sexual behaviors when their preferences did not align with 
their partners’ preferences, or why there were differential effects among sex workers vs. non-sex workers. 
Although we provided potential explanations, qualitative research is essential to provide an in-depth 
understanding of the mechanisms through which HIV information affects women’s sexual relationships.   
4.6 Conclusions 
In a generalized HIV epidemic, potential HIV transmission is a constant risk that affects individuals’ 
decision-making in sexual relationships and HIV-negative status is considered a desirable but often 
hidden trait in sexual partners. This paper uses the exogenous variation in HIV-status disclosure from a 
randomized design to show that women with multiple sexual partners in Kenya used their HIV-negative 
status to make informed decisions in their sexual relationships. Specifically, disclosing HIV-negative 
status reduced relationship dissolution, increased prices for transactional sex, and allowed women to exert 
greater control over sexual behaviors. Our study contributes to the small but growing literature on the 
broader beneficial effects of expanded HIV testing services beyond identifying HIV-positive cases, 
including safer sexual behaviors and better psychological wellbeing among HIV-negative women.62–64 
Importantly, our findings echo previous research that argues that women, even those who are dependent 
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on sex work, have agency in sexual relationships and HIV information could help them further exercise 




TABLE 12. Sample description 
 Full Sample Intervention Control 
Number of clusters 66 33 33 
Total number of women at the baseline survey 2087 1054 1033 
   Ever exchanged sex for money 1981 (94.9%) 998 (94.7%) 983 (95.2%) 
Women who completed the 6-month survey, % of baseline 1831(87.7%) 919 (87.2%) 912 (88.3%) 
   With a primary partner 1772 (96.8%) 888 (96.6%) 884 (96.9%) 
   Tested HIV-negative 1822 (99.5%) 915 (99.6%) 907 (99.5%) 
Women who completed the 12-month survey, % of baseline 1783 (85.4%) 896 (85.0%) 887 (85.9%) 
   With a primary partner 1708 (95.8%) 862 (96.2%) 846 (95.4%) 
   Tested HIV-negative 1766 (99.1%) 886 (98.9%) 880 (99.2%) 
Primary partner includes husband, boyfriend, and someone a woman regularly has sex with.   
HIV test results include positive and indeterminate in addition to negative.  
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TABLE 13. Comparison of attrition across intervention arms 
 (1) (2) 
 Lost to follow-up at 6-month survey Lost to follow-up at 12-month survey 
Intervention 0.011 0.008 
 [-0.024,0.046] [-0.026,0.043] 
Observations 2087 2087 
95% confidence intervals in brackets 
Regression estimates from linear probability models that included strata fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the level of geographic area clusters. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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TABLE 14. Baseline characteristics by experimental arm  
 
All Intervention Control p-
value 
N 1822 915 907 
 
Age, mean (SD) 27.5 (6.9) 27.6 (6.9) 27.4 (6.9) 0.62 
Highest level of school completed 
   
0.58 
   less than primary 593 (32.5%) 302 (33.0%) 291 (32.1%) 
 
   primary 566 (31.1%) 274 (29.9%) 292 (32.2%) 
 
   more than primary 663 (36.4%) 339 (37.0%) 324 (35.7%) 
 
Number of people to support, mean (SD) 3.0 (2.2) 2.9 (2.1) 3.0 (2.2) 0.56 
Overall health 
   
0.17 
   Very Good 45 (2.5%) 22 (2.4%) 23 (2.5%) 
 
   Good 602 (33.0%) 294 (32.1%) 308 (34.0%) 
 
   Fair 1073 (58.9%) 537 (58.7%) 536 (59.1%) 
 
   Poor 102 (5.6%) 62 (6.8%) 40 (4.4%) 
 








   
0.16 
   Married 1207 (66.2%) 590 (64.5%) 617 (68.0%) 
 
   In a relationship but not married 167 (9.2%) 94 (10.3%) 73 (8.0%) 
 
   Not in a relationship 448 (24.6%) 231 (25.2%) 217 (23.9%) 
 
With a primary partner 1747 (95.9%) 878 (96.0%) 869 (95.8%) 0.88 
Number of sexual partners last month, mean (SD) 2.8 (1.7) 2.8 (2.0) 2.7 (1.2) 0.40 
Age at 1st sex, mean (SD) 15.9 (2.2) 15.8 (2.3) 15.9 (2.2) 0.20 
Ever exchanged sex for money 1730 (95.0%) 865 (94.5%) 865 (95.4%) 0.42 
Sex work as primary income source 272 (14.9%) 128 (14.0%) 144 (15.9%) 0.26 
Age difference (partner - woman), mean (SD) 5.5 (5.2) 5.4 (5.3) 5.7 (5.1) 0.22 
Experienced intimate partner violence past 12 months 896 (49.2%) 442 (48.3%) 454 (50.1%) 0.46 
Had no difficulty negotiating condom use last month 596 (40.9%) 312 (42.3%) 284 (39.6%) 0.29 
Number of men exchanged sex with last month, mean (SD) 1.9 (1.7) 2.0 (2.1) 1.9 (1.2) 0.40 
Charge per sexual encounter with condom (KES), mean (SD) 921.1 (1204.6) 950.1 (1482.7) 891.4 (827.2) 0.40 
















Abbreviations: SD, standard deviation; KES: Kenyan Shillings 
Sample included only women who completed the 6-month survey and excluded those with HIV testing results that were positive 
or indeterminate (less than .5% of the full sample).    
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TABLE 15. Effects of disclosing HIV-negative status on relationship outcomes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 










2SLS 0.033 -0.275* 0.298 0.565 
[-0.133,0.200] [-0.494,-0.056] [-0.714,1.311] [-0.395,1.526] 
BiProbit 0.045 -0.260** -- -- 
 [-0.125,0.215] [-0.435,-0.085]   
    p-value for Murphy’s score test  0.858 0.978 -- -- 
2SRI 0.042 -0.286* -- -- 
 [-0.134,0.218] [-0.517,-0.054]   
N 1611 1611 1611 1351 
Control mean 0.889 0.291 1.962 1.517 
95% confidence intervals in brackets 
Disclosing HIV-negative status indicates a participant disclosed her HIV-negative status to her primary partner in the past 6 
months. Study arm assignment was used to instrument disclosing own HIV status at 6-month follow-up survey with a first-stage 
F-statistic of 52.5. Outcomes were measured at 12-month follow-up survey. Same primary partner indicates whether a 
participant was with the same primary partner she had 6 months ago. Ended any sexual relationship indicates whether a 
participant had a sexual relationship ended in the past 6 months by the participant or any of her partners. The time frame for 
Number of sexual partners and Number of transactional partners is past month. 2SLS: two-stage least squares model with 
standard errors clustered at the level of geographic area clusters. BiProbit: bivariate probit model with errors modeled as jointly 
normal (Murphy’s score test was used to test departure from normality). 2SRI: two-stage residual inclusion model that used a 
probit model in both stages with bootstrapped standard errors (500 repetitions). In the 2SLS models, all outcomes were grouped 
together to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing using the Romano-Wolf method. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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TABLE 16. Relationship dissolution and partner testing details 
 6-month survey 12-month survey 
 All women Sex workers All women Sex workers 
Panel A. Relationship dissolution details     
One or more sexual relationship ended, % 
of all women 
589 (32.3%) 422 (34.6%) 466 (26.4%) 328 (27.9%) 
Number of women who decided themselves 
(instead of their partners) to end a 
relationship, % of all women who had 
relationship ended 
536 (90.9%) 380 (89.8%) 439 (94.2%) 310 (94.5%) 
Number of women whose relationship 
ended due to partner’s refusing to get 
tested or positive HIV test results, % of all 
women who had relationship ended 
222 (37.6%) 160 (37.8%) 112 (24.0%) 79 (24.1%) 
Panel B. Primary partner testing details     
Number of women who gave their sexual 
partners HIV self-tests or vouchers for 
facility-based tests, % of all women  
1694 (93.0%) 1125 (92.2%) 1607 (91.2%) 1066 (90.7%) 
Number of women who had at least one 
HIV-positive sexual partner, % of all 
women who gave sexual partners HIV 
self-tests or vouchers  
176 (10.4%) 123 (10.9%) 78 (4.9%) 51 (4.8%) 
* Who decided to end relationship and relationship ended due to partner’s refusing to HIV test or positive results are based on 
the first episode of relationship dissolution participants reported. For women who had relationship ended, fewer than 5% reported 
decision-maker and 20% reported reasons for more than one episode of relationship dissolution. Sex worker status was defined by 
whether sex work was a participant’s primary or secondary source of income measured at the baseline survey. The time frame for 
all outcomes is past 6 months.
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TABLE 17. Effects of disclosing HIV-negative status on transactional sex prices and income 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Outcome:  Charge per sexual 
encounter with 
condom (KES) 
Charge per sexual 
encounter without 
condom (KES) 
Total value of sexual 




Panel A: Disclosing HIV status at 6-month  
Effects at 6-month 359.417 509.210 1,070.244 -1459.222 
 [-578.436,1,297.271] [-534.633,1,553.052] [-1128.597,3,269.086] [-6927.554,4,009.109] 
N 1073 843 1316 1752 
Control mean 760.387 968.456 2,352.196 3,832.120 
Effects at 12-month 495.690 649.079 -51.328 2,674.767 
 [-193.416,1,184.796] [41.698,1,256.461] [-2312.334,2,209.677] [-1275.224,6,624.757] 
N 910 712 1086 1608 
Control mean 783.333 936.131 1,946.750 3,950.350 
Panel B: Disclosing HIV status at 12-month  
Effects at 12-month 535.107 764.805* 967.588 2,051.073 
 [-375.491,1,445.705] [187.165,1,342.445] [-1449.504,3,384.679] [-1966.236,6,068.383] 
N 953 737 1131 1687 
Control mean 731.737 913.139 1,937.563 3,805.158 
95% confidence intervals in brackets 
Disclosing HIV-negative status indicates a participant shared her HIV-negative status with her partner in the past 6 months. Study 
arm assignment was used to instrument disclosing own HIV status at 6-month and 12-month follow-up surveys with first-stage F-
statistic of 52.5 and 36.5 respectively. Two-stage least squares models with standard errors clustered at the level of geographic 
area clusters. Outcomes were grouped together to adjust for multiple hypothesis testing using the Romano-Wolf method. 
KES: Kenyan shillings 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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TABLE 18. Effects of disclosing HIV-negative status on condom use and agency 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Outcome:  No difficulty 
negotiating condom 
use  
Condom use last sex Free from intimate 
partner violence  
Declined sex due to 
refusal to test or 
positive result 
Panel A: Disclosing HIV status at 6-month  
Effects at 6-month -0.265 -0.159 0.160 0.315** 
 [-0.695,0.165] [-0.512,0.193] [-0.160,0.480] [0.119,0.511] 
Model 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Effects at 6-month -0.187 -0.115 0.186 0.185*** 
 [-0.444,0.070] [-0.356,0.125] [-0.122.,0.494] [0.091,0.279] 
Model BiProbit BiProbit 2SRI BiProbit 
N 1588 1758 1758 1754 
Control mean 0.442 0.409 0.805 0.073 
Effects at 12-month -0.179 -0.063 -0.057 0.000 
 [-0.643,0.285] [-0.372,0.247] [-0.274,0.160] [-0.126,0.126] 
Model 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Effects at 12-month -0.166 -0.079 -0.038 0.004 
 [-0.474,0.141] [-0.324,0.166] [-0.170, 0.094] [-0.075,0.084] 
Model BiProbit BiProbit 2SRI BiProbit 
N 1369 1610 1611 1609 
Control mean 0.452 0.405 0.917 0.066 
Panel B: Disclosing HIV status at 12-month  
Effects at 12-month -0.105 0.001 -0.077 -0.050 
 [-0.517,0.308] [-0.364,0.365] [-0.307,0.152] [-0.194,0.094] 
Model 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Effects at 12-month -0.016 0.027 -0.065 -0.058 
 [-0.297,0.265] [-0.244,0.297] [-0.228,0.098] [-0.252,0.136] 
Model BiProbit BiProbit 2SRI BiProbit 
N 1477 1688 1689 1687 
Control mean 0.424 0.413 0.940 0.054 
95% confidence intervals in brackets 
Disclosing HIV-negative status indicates a participant shared her HIV-negative status with her partner in the past 6 months. Study 
arm assignment was used to instrument disclosing own HIV status at 6-month and 12-month follow-up surveys with first-stage F-
statistic of 52.5 and 36.5 respectively. No difficulty negotiating condom use indicates that a participant had difficulty negotiating 
condom use with primary sexual partner in the past month. Condom use last sex indicates a participant used a condom the last 
time she had sex with any sexual partner. Free from intimate partner violence indicates that a participant was free from any type 
of physical, sexual, and emotional violence in the past 6 months. Declined sex due to refusal to test or positive result indicates 
that a woman declined to have sex with any sexual partner after the partner refused to accept a HIV self-test/voucher or after the 
partner tested HIV-positive in the past 6 months. BiProbit: bivariate probit model with errors modeled as jointly normal 
(Murphy’s score test is used to test departure from normality). 2SLS: two-stage least squares model with standard errors clustered 
at the level of geographic area clusters. 2SRI: two-stage residual inclusion model that used a probit model in both stages with 
bootstrapped standard errors (500 repetitions). For binary outcomes, results from BiProbit models were reported by default. If the 
assumption of joint normality was not met, results from 2SRI models were reported.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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TABLE 19. Effects of disclosing HIV-negative status by sex worker status 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: disclosure at 6-month on relationship outcomes at 12-month 
 Same primary partner Ended any sexual 
relationship  
Number of sexual partners Number of transactional 
partners 
Sex workers 0.104 -0.454** 0.426 0.472 
[-0.122,0.330] [-0.789,-0.120] [-0.803,1.655] [-0.743,1.687] 
N 1073 1073 1073 928 
Control mean 0.868 0.308 1.978 1.577 
Non-sex workers -0.072 -0.014 0.02 0.683 
[-0.347,0.203] [-0.292,0.265] [-1.118,1.157] [-0.317,1.683] 
N 538 538 538 423 
Control mean 0.925 0.262 1.935 1.402 
p-value 0.578 0.024 0.769 0.376 
Panel B: disclosure at 6-month on transactional sex prices and income at 6-month 
 Charge per sexual 
encounter with condom 
(KES) 
Charge per sexual 
encounter without condom 
(KES) 
Total value of sexual 
transactions last month 
(KES) 
Typical monthly income 
(KES) 
Sex workers -7.052 62.254 -213.584 -768.429 
[-1341.059,1,326.955] [-1330.982,1,455.490] [-3144.288,2,717.121] [-4561.378,3,024.520] 
N 735 600 889 1168 
Control mean 846.522 1,015.79 2,707.14 3,853.55 
Non-sex workers 706.371 957.83 1,202.70 -3818.587 
[-76.089,1,488.831] [-230.596,2,146.256] [-716.315,3,121.722] [-1.53e+04,7,698.254] 
N 338 243 427 584 
Control mean 610.303 885.185 1,770.60 3,796.64 
p-value 0.188 0.282 0.466 0.772 
Panel C: disclosure at 12-month on transactional sex prices and income at 12-month 
 Charge per sexual 
encounter with condom 
(KES) 
Charge per sexual 
encounter without condom 
(KES) 
Total value of sexual 
transactions last month 
(KES) 
Typical monthly income 
(KES) 
Sex workers 93.662 517.916 -541.106 179.829 
[-912.888,1,100.213] [-284.736,1,320.568] [-3588.826,2,506.613] [-4746.916,5,106.574] 
N 645 523 772 1125 
Control mean 843.689 995.556 1,950.39 4,158.93 
Non-sex workers 1,373.127* 1,038.566* 3,212.856* 3,743.66 
[167.133,2,579.121] [97.093,1,980.038] [673.615,5,752.098] [-821.161,8,308.473] 
N 311 219 364 572 
Control mean 690.566 879.487 2,073.39 3,805.94 
p-value 0.068 0.035 0.035 0.275 
Panel D: disclosure at 6-month on condom use and agency at 6-month 
 No difficulty negotiating 
condom use  
Condom use last sex Free from intimate partner 
violence  
Declined sex due to refusal 
to test or positive result 
Sex workers -0.263 -0.162 -0.016 0.415** 
[-0.744,0.219] [-0.605,0.282] [-0.348,0.315] [0.152,0.678] 
N 1053 1172 1172 1170 
Control mean 0.482 0.399 0.838 0.081 
Non-sex workers -0.284 -0.131 0.424 0.141 
[-0.800,0.232] [-0.507,0.244] [-0.053,0.901] [-0.047,0.329] 
N 535 586 586 584 
Control mean 0.377 0.425 0.75 0.059 
p-value 0.452 0.688 0.194 0.007 
Panel E: disclosure at 12-month on condom use and agency at 12-month 
 No difficulty negotiating 
condom use  
Condom use last sex Free from intimate partner 
violence  
Declined sex due to refusal 
to test or positive result 
Sex workers 0.011 -0.008 -0.177 -0.114 
[-0.500,0.521] [-0.444,0.428] [-0.422,0.068] [-0.312,0.084] 
N 978 1125 1126 1124 
Control mean 0.412 0.414 0.935 0.089 
Non-sex workers -0.289 0.098 0.152 0.022 
[-0.776,0.199] [-0.400,0.595] [-0.212,0.515] [-0.166,0.210] 
N 505 573 573 573 
Control mean 0.516 0.382 0.892 0.039 
p-value 0.453 0.924 0.198 0.488 
95% confidence intervals in brackets 
Sex worker status was defined by whether sex work was a participant’s primary or secondary source of income measured at the 
baseline survey. Disclosing HIV-negative status indicates a participant disclosed the result of her HIV test to her primary partner 
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in the past 6 months. Same primary partner indicates whether a participant was with the same primary partner she had 6 months 
ago. Ended any sexual relationship indicates whether a participant had a sexual relationship ended in the past 6 months by the 
participant or any of her partners. The time frame for Number of sexual partners and Number of transactional partners is past 
month. No difficulty negotiating condom use indicates that a participant had difficulty negotiating condom use with primary 
sexual partner in the past month. Condom use last sex indicates a participant used a condom the last time she had sex with any 
sexual partner. Free from intimate partner violence indicates that a participant was free from any type of physical, sexual, and 
emotional violence in the past 6 months. Declined sex due to refusal to test or positive result indicates that a woman declined to 
have sex with any sexual partner after the partner refused to accept a HIV self-test/voucher or after the partner tested HIV-
positive in the past 6 months. Study arm assignment was used to instrument disclosing own HIV status at 6-month and 12-month 
follow-up survey with first-stage F-statistic of 52.5 and 36.5 respectively. All models are two-stage least squares models with 
standard errors clustered at the level of geographic area clusters. The p-value rows report the two-sided p-values from a Wald-test 
of equality of the treatment effects for sex workers vs. non-sex workers. KES: Kenyan shillings 









CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
 
Policies and programs that expand access to sexual and reproductive health services in resource-
limited settings can increase women’s and girls’ ability to exercise agency in decisions important to their 
health, development, and wellbeing. This dissertation has demonstrated their potential and limitations 
through evaluating three different interventions in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), namely abortion legal 
reforms, free access to expanded family planning services, and HIV-status disclosure as a result of access 
to HIV self-tests. While all three interventions are associated with some positive impacts on various 
indicators of agency, they do not remove all constraints women and girls face to take control of their life, 
nor do they increase choice for all women and girls. The results from this dissertation provide a nuanced 
understanding of intervention impacts, call for careful consideration in policy decisions, and point to 
important topics for future research.  
In Chapter 2, I studied policy reforms that expanded the legal grounds for abortion on marriage, birth, 
and schooling outcomes among adolescent girls and young women in 18 countries in SSA. I found that 
abortion liberalization was associated with a reduction of more than 7% of the annual likelihood of 
marriage and birth, with largest effects among those from younger age groups, rural areas, and lower 
wealth quintiles. Whether such reforms improved access to abortion services or merely signaled greater 
political will to protect women’s health and rights, the liberalization of abortion laws enhanced the ability 
of adolescent girls and young women to make key life choices, had important implications for maternal 
and child health, and was especially beneficial to those with the fewest resources. However, the legal 
reforms did not have any effect on schooling rate, likely because other factors play a more direct role in 
girls’ education decisions, such as economic pressures or lack of job opportunities. This chapter 
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contributes to the literature on broader implications of reproductive health policies on women’s agency, 
which has been largely concentrated in high-income settings. 
In Chapter 3, I assessed whether free access to a broad contraceptive method mix affected women’s 
contraceptive use and decision-making in eight countries with high unmet needs for family planning 
services in SSA. I found that free access to both long- and short-term reversible contraceptives was 
associated with a modest increase in women’s contraceptive use, which was driven by greater use of 
short-term methods. Among current contraceptive users, removing the cost barrier did not prompt women 
to switch to the more effective long-term methods or increase women’s autonomy in contraceptive 
decision-making. While women that were older, more educated, and more knowledgeable about family 
planning used contraceptives more when services were offered for free, it is alarming that free access was 
associated with lower contraceptive use among teenagers. This might be because factors other than user 
fees are more prominent barriers to young women’s uptake of family planning services, such as stockout 
of contraceptive commodities and provider biases against unmarried young women. The results from this 
chapter are consistent with existing literature in that removing user fees alone had only limited effects on 
women’s contraceptive use, contrary to the evidence from high-income settings. The findings also 
highlight the importance of combining financial subsidies with other approaches to address multiple 
barriers women face in accessing sexual and reproductive health services.  
In Chapter 4, I explored whether disclosing HIV-negative status affected intimate partner and 
transactional sex relationships for women with multiple sexual partners in Kenya. I found that disclosing 
HIV-negative status to sexual partners reduced relationship dissolution, substantially increased price of 
unprotected transactional sex, and increased women’s ability to decline sex with a partner who might be 
HIV-positive. Meanwhile, disclosing HIV-negative status did not affect condom use or put women at 
greater risk of violence. These results indicate that women could safely use HIV information to inform 
their decisions in sexual relationships, contributing to the small but growing literature on the beneficial 
effects of expanded testing services in a generalized HIV epidemic beyond identifying HIV-positive 
cases. 
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The ways women and girls exercise agency, or the ability to make strategic life choices,23 vary widely 
across settings. These three studies focused on different interventions, indicators of agency, and 
mechanisms through which women and girls can gain and express agency, which reflects the fact that 
decision-making power manifests in multiple and often intersecting domains in a woman’s life. Despite 
these differences, in all three studies I explored the intersectionality between gender and other forms of 
inequality through analyzing the differential effects of interventions among key segments of the study 
populations. While abortion liberalization was more beneficial to adolescent girls and young women from 
rural areas and lower economic background, free access to contraceptives did not seem to reach women 
who were most in need, including those younger, less educated, or less knowledgeable about family 
planning. Disclosing HIV-negative status led to higher income for women who did not consider sex work 
as their primary or secondary source of income. By comparison, sex workers whose livelihood was 
dependent on transactional sex were not able to bargain for higher pay, although HIV information allowed 
them to choose safer partners and have more control in sexual behaviors. The understanding of 
heterogeneous intervention effects is important to policy decisions as it provides insights on optimal ways 
to allocate limited resources while advancing equity. For example, to increase access to family planning 
services for all women, it might be more effective to combine partial subsidies, such as free provision to 
the most popular contraceptive methods, with other approaches that address information, supply chain, or 
provider barriers than full subsidies. Future studies should also prioritize evaluating interventions that 
target women and girls who face the combined discrimination from gender and other aspects of social, 
economic, and political identities.  
This dissertation alludes that gender norms, or social norms reflected in individuals’ attitudes about 
how women and men should behave based on their gender, moderate the effects of policies and programs, 
which echoes the findings from a recent review on interventions across different domains of women’s 
agency.194 For changes in abortion legality to lead to greater access to abortion services, there needs to be 
a social norm shift that gives women and girls more control over their body and in their childbearing 
decisions. Even if family planning services are provided free of charge, many women would still not gain 
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real access due to the expectations that a woman should not have sex before marriage, could only use a 
contraceptive method agreed upon by her husband, or would not need contraception before having several 
children. While HIV information could inform women’s decision-making in transactional sex 
relationships, the stigma against sex workers, the social norm that condones sex work but refuses to 
formalize it, and the gender prejudices that limit women’s economic opportunities will all restrict 
women’s ability to benefit from expanded HIV testing services. High-level policy changes, such as the 
abortion legal reforms I studied, might accelerate changes in social norms, but perhaps a lower-hanging 
fruit is to start with changing women’s own attitudes about gender norms. Future studies could include 
measures of individual and collective gender norms to assess interventions’ effects on these important 
direct indicators of women’s agency.  
This dissertation used innovative approaches to make a significant contribution to the literature. First, 
I focused on important topics in sexual and reproductive health and went beyond health impacts to 
examine broader social and economic implications of these interventions on women’s decision-making 
power. Second, I used advanced econometric methods to estimate intervention impacts, including 
difference-in-differences, propensity scores, and instrumental variables. These quasi-experimental 
approaches account for selection and produce findings that are more generalizable than randomized 
designs. Third, this dissertation demonstrated creative use of secondary data to answer new research 
questions. These approaches include combing data from policy database and existing surveys to generate 
a pseudo-panel dataset, linking individual and community-level survey data, and conducting secondary 
analysis of data from a randomized controlled trial. 
The studies in this dissertation have several common limitations. First, all studies used quasi-
experimental designs to estimate intervention effects and each approach makes different assumptions that 
could not be all tested. Future studies that use experimental designs might have higher internal validity 
than the quasi-experimental studies in this dissertation. Second, although these studies provided 
quantitative estimates of intervention effects, they did not address questions such as what it is like for 
women and girls to receive interventions, through what mechanisms these interventions affected women’s 
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and girls’ decision-making, or why the intervention impacts were only observed in certain subgroups of 
the study populations. Future research that uses qualitative or mixed methods will provide the details and 
depth that are essential to our understanding of complex and sensitive topics such as sexual behaviors and 
decision-making. Third, Chapel 2 and Chapel 3 pooled data from multiple countries and did not allow 
analysis of how country-specific implementation, socioeconomic contexts, and social norms affected 
policy or program impacts. Future analyses that focus on a single setting would provide more direct 
evidence for policy decisions. Fourth, the use of secondary data restricted the availability of variables to 
be used in the analyses. Some variables were not the ideal measures of the outcomes I studied, such as a 
single question to measure contraceptive decision-making, while other outcomes were not measured in 
the original surveys or were only available for a subset of study participants, such as abortion incidence or 
knowledge of sexual partner’s HIV status. Nevertheless, the studies in this dissertation point towards 
important areas for primary data collection in future research and serve as a starting point for me to 
explore promising topics in the field of gender, health, and development.   
Taken together, this dissertation shows that policies and programs in sexual and reproductive health 
could strengthen women’s and girls’ decision-making power in various domains of their life in resource-
limited settings. Abortion legalization, free access to contraceptives, and HIV testing services all enable 
women and girls to make more informed decisions by expanding their choices. However, these 
interventions do not remove all barriers to exercising agency or equally benefit all women and girls, 
highlighting the importance of addressing multiple intersecting constraints. While each study contributes 
to a different strain of literature under the overarching subject of women’s and girls’ empowerment, a 
promising direction for future research across all studies is to use alternative and complementary 
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FIGURE A3. Classification tree based on the training sub-sample 
 
 
This figure shows the simplified version of the pruned decision tree created by recursive partitioning (did 
not show all nodes). The tree model aims to predict contraceptive use (yes or no in the leaves) by 
classifying individuals into distinct groups based on a list of observed characteristics. The training sub-
sample used in the exercise is a randomly generated half sample of the full dataset. The other half sub-
sample is used in estimating treatment effects. Based on the pruned tree, the primary splits for the first 
node include marital status (shown in this figure), family planning knowledge (<-1.14), and age (< 19.5). 
These variables are also the three highest ranked variables based on the variable importance measure, 
which indicates how much a model uses a given variable to make accurate predictions.  
  
marstat = Never married,Widow
fpknoscore < −1.2
country = Burkina Faso,Ghana,Niger,Nigeria,Uganda,Cote d'Ivoire
fpknoscore < 1.9
country = Ghana,Nigeria,Uganda,Cote d'Ivoire
edu = No school
age >= 44
marstat = Divorced or separated
country = Ghana,Nigeria
wealthq = Lowest quintile
age >= 43
age < 25
wealthq = Lower quintile,Middle quintile,Higher quintile
marstat = Divorced or separated
age >= 44
fpknoscore < 0.54
wealthq = Lowest quintile,Lower quintile,Middle quintile


























































































Benin 41845 6505 139.7 45.8 397.9 
Burkina Faso 32073 5386 237.2 69.5 337.7 
Burundi 77726 11767 164.8 61.5 366.3 
Cameroon 85263 13815 298.5 100.9 318.1 
Congo Democratic Republic 85614 12220 328.8 111.4 331.6 
Cote d'Ivoire 18663 2959 168.4 71.6 384.9 
Ethiopia 100226 15773 235.2 57.0 460.2 
Kenya 213498 32051 284.0 114.2 352.3 
Lesotho 92416 13707 260.8 83.9 279.0 
Madagascar 35780 6483 291.7 78.7 317.9 
Malawi 209247 30430 382.9 129.4 283.6 
Mali 29507 4817 345.8 92.6 424.0 
Mozambique 52974 8025 327.3 116.4 270.8 
Niger 23406 3969 313.1 96.6 315.6 
Nigeria 248911 35764 243.7 83.6 475.6 
Rwanda 118246 18411 152.2 61.3 242.3 
Senegal 165242 24461 189.0 56.6 382.5 
Zimbabwe 155673 23879 328.4 103.0 386.4 
* Marriage, birth, and schooling rates per 1,000 person-years, calculated as simple means across all person-years.
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TABLE A2. Effects of expanding abortion legal grounds, excluding one country at a time 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Benin Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Congo DR Cote_dIvoire Ethiopia Kenya Lesotho 
Marriage -0.026 -0.025 -0.025* -0.026* -0.027* -0.026* -0.029* -0.032* -0.028* 
 (0.054) (0.051) (0.049) (0.048) (0.034) (0.040) (0.036) (0.011) (0.026) 
Birth -0.008** -0.007* -0.008** -0.008* -0.008* -0.008** -0.008* -0.008** -0.007* 
 (0.005) (0.012) (0.006) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.017) (0.006) (0.016) 
Schooling 0.008 0.007 0.003 0.008 0.001 0.008 0.002 0.007 0.002 
 (0.764) (0.769) (0.905) (0.760) (0.964) (0.762) (0.926) (0.777) (0.932) 
Observations 1744465 1754237 1708584 1701047 1700696 1767647 1686084 1572812 1693894 
 Madagascar Malawi Mali Mozambique Niger Nigeria Rwanda Senegal Zimbabwe 
Marriage -0.024 -0.022 -0.024 -0.027* -0.028* -0.019 -0.019 -0.025 -0.020 
 (0.060) (0.096) (0.059) (0.043) (0.031) (0.129) (0.091) (0.056) (0.104) 
Birth -0.008** -0.007* -0.007* -0.008** -0.008** -0.006* -0.006* -0.007* -0.006* 
 (0.004) (0.015) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007) (0.047) (0.025) (0.019) (0.026) 
Schooling 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.011 0.001 0.029* -0.005 
 (0.927) (0.864) (0.833) (0.785) (0.776) (0.665) (0.975) (0.033) (0.853) 
Observations 1750530 1577063 1756803 1733336 1762904 1537399 1668064 1621068 1630637 
p-values in parentheses 
The country in the model title was excluded. 
Included individual characteristics and country and year fixed effects. 
Standard errors clustered at country level. 
Included only individuals that were still in school at age 12. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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TABLE A3. Effects of expanding abortion legal grounds, excluding Kenya and Senegal 
 Marriage Birth Schooling 
Treat -0.032* -0.008* 0.030* 
 [-0.056,-0.007] [-0.014,-0.002] [0.001,0.059] 
Small  -0.034* -0.009* 0.048** 
 [-0.067,-0.001] [-0.017,-0.001] [0.014,0.081] 
Large  -0.029 -0.007 0.010 
 [-0.060,0.002] [-0.016,0.002] [-0.012,0.031] 
P-value (Large = Small) 0.053 0.037 0.026 
Age 0.076*** 0.024*** -0.088*** 
 [0.064,0.089] [0.020,0.028] [-0.096,-0.080] 
Rural 0.036*** 0.012*** -0.047*** 
 [0.025,0.047] [0.008,0.017] [-0.069,-0.026] 
Poorer -0.022** -0.007* 0.028** 
 [-0.036,-0.007] [-0.013,-0.002] [0.013,0.043] 
Middle -0.045** -0.015** 0.079*** 
 [-0.072,-0.017] [-0.024,-0.006] [0.043,0.114] 
Richer -0.073*** -0.027*** 0.141*** 
 [-0.102,-0.045] [-0.038,-0.015] [0.091,0.192] 
Richest -0.156*** -0.054*** 0.292*** 
 [-0.191,-0.121] [-0.068,-0.041] [0.243,0.342] 
Observations 1407570 1407570 1407570 
Adjusted R2 0.2734 0.0685 0.3493 
mean 0.306 0.100 0.344 
 
95% confidence intervals in brackets 
Included country and year fixed effects. 
Standard errors clustered at country level. 
Small: abortion legal grounds expanded from “to save life & preserve physical health” to including “to preserve 
mental health”. 
Large: abortion legal grounds expanded from “to save life” only to including “to preserve mental health”. 
Excluded Senegal and Kenya – two countries that increased the duration of compulsory education. 
Included only individuals that were still in school at age 12. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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TABLE A4: Effects of expanding abortion legal grounds, restricted to years with abortion policy 
surveys 
 Marriage Birth Schooling 
Treat -0.025 -0.012* 0.015 
 [-0.056,0.005] [-0.024,-0.000] [-0.037,0.067] 
Small  -0.040 -0.018* 0.021 
 [-0.080,0.000] [-0.032,-0.005] [-0.036,0.079] 
Large  -0.012 -0.006 0.009 
 [-0.057,0.032] [-0.021,0.009] [-0.043,0.062] 
P-value (Large = Small) 0.137 0.038 0.670 
Age 0.075*** 0.024*** -0.088*** 
 [0.064,0.085] [0.020,0.027] [-0.094,-0.082] 
Rural 0.033** 0.011** -0.050*** 
 [0.011,0.054] [0.004,0.018] [-0.073,-0.026] 
Poorer -0.031** -0.007* 0.040*** 
 [-0.048,-0.013] [-0.013,-0.001] [0.023,0.057] 
Middle -0.061*** -0.020** 0.093*** 
 [-0.086,-0.036] [-0.031,-0.009] [0.063,0.123] 
Richer -0.092*** -0.033*** 0.151*** 
 [-0.117,-0.067] [-0.045,-0.021] [0.109,0.193] 
Richest -0.171*** -0.062*** 0.290*** 
 [-0.202,-0.141] [-0.077,-0.047] [0.248,0.332] 
Observations 765460 765460 765460 
Adjusted R2 0.2662 0.0683 0.3359 
mean 0.290 0.094 0.346 
 
95% confidence intervals in brackets 
Included country and year fixed effects. 
Standard errors clustered at country level. 
Small: abortion legal grounds expanded from “to save life & preserve physical health” to including “to preserve 
mental health”. 
Large: abortion legal grounds expanded from “to save life” only to including “to preserve mental health”. 
Included only years when abortion policy surveys were available: 1996, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013, 
2015. 
Included only individuals that were still in school at age 12. 




TABLE A5. Effects of expanding abortion legal grounds, including men and women 
 All 13 – 15 years of age 16 – 18 years of age 19 – 22years of age 
 Marriage Schooling Marriage Schooling Marriage Schooling Marriage Schooling 
Treat 0.000 0.002 0.001 -0.004 0.020 0.009 0.008 0.002 
 [-0.022,0.022] [-0.056,0.059] [-0.010,0.013] [-0.092,0.084] [-0.010,0.050] [-0.063,0.081] [-0.019,0.036] [-0.035,0.040] 
Treat x Female -0.034 0.013 -0.011 0.020 -0.051* 0.017 -0.058* 0.005 
 [-0.074,0.007] [-0.012,0.038] [-0.024,0.002] [-0.015,0.056] [-0.098,-0.003] [-0.021,0.055] [-0.116,-0.000] [-0.012,0.022] 
Small  0.012 0.015 0.009 0.006 0.036 0.008 0.014 0.032 
 [-0.012,0.036] [-0.044,0.074] [-0.008,0.026] [-0.094,0.106] [-0.006,0.078] [-0.069,0.085] [-0.006,0.035] [-0.011,0.074] 
Small x Female -0.065* 0.020 -0.019 0.036 -0.084* 0.036 -0.103* -0.002 
 [-0.125,-0.006] [-0.010,0.050] [-0.041,0.003] [-0.004,0.075] [-0.157,-0.010] [-0.007,0.079] [-0.186,-0.021] [-0.026,0.021] 
Large  -0.011 -0.011 -0.005 -0.014 0.006 0.009 0.005 -0.025 
 [-0.032,0.011] [-0.069,0.048] [-0.018,0.007] [-0.101,0.073] [-0.021,0.033] [-0.065,0.083] [-0.031,0.040] [-0.058,0.007] 
Large x Female -0.009 0.010 -0.004 0.009 -0.025 0.004 -0.027 0.014 
 [-0.036,0.018] [-0.017,0.036] [-0.017,0.010] [-0.027,0.046] [-0.064,0.013] [-0.034,0.041] [-0.065,0.012] [-0.001,0.028] 
P-value (Large = Small) 0.314 0.169 0.412 0.712 0.231 0.967 0.356 0.125 
Female 0.215*** -0.052*** 0.047*** -0.044** 0.213*** -0.071*** 0.379*** -0.041*** 
 [0.188,0.241] [-0.078,-0.027] [0.036,0.057] [-0.076,-0.012] [0.178,0.249] [-0.107,-0.036] [0.344,0.414] [-0.055,-0.028] 
Age 0.060*** -0.088*** -- -- -- -- -- -- 
 [0.050,0.069] [-0.095,-0.081]       
Rural 0.025** -0.051*** 0.003 -0.061*** 0.019* -0.067*** 0.049*** -0.027** 
 [0.009,0.040] [-0.071,-0.030] [-0.004,0.010] [-0.083,-0.038] [0.001,0.037] [-0.094,-0.039] [0.023,0.075] [-0.043,-0.010] 
Poorer -0.022*** 0.039*** -0.007* 0.065*** -0.029*** 0.044*** -0.032*** 0.005* 
 [-0.033,-0.011] [0.022,0.055] [-0.012,-0.002] [0.038,0.092] [-0.044,-0.015] [0.022,0.065] [-0.047,-0.016] [0.000,0.010] 
Middle -0.043*** 0.089*** -0.014** 0.134*** -0.051*** 0.112*** -0.068*** 0.018*** 
 [-0.062,-0.025] [0.060,0.118] [-0.022,-0.006] [0.093,0.175] [-0.073,-0.028] [0.068,0.156] [-0.096,-0.039] [0.009,0.027] 
Richer -0.069*** 0.145*** -0.021*** 0.197*** -0.077*** 0.193*** -0.108*** 0.047*** 
 [-0.088,-0.049] [0.104,0.187] [-0.029,-0.012] [0.147,0.246] [-0.100,-0.053] [0.124,0.262] [-0.140,-0.077] [0.026,0.067] 
Richest -0.133*** 0.285*** -0.033*** 0.312*** -0.134*** 0.374*** -0.219*** 0.169*** 
 [-0.157,-0.110] [0.245,0.326] [-0.043,-0.024] [0.266,0.357] [-0.163,-0.105] [0.309,0.439] [-0.253,-0.185] [0.125,0.212] 
Observations 2659340 2659340 877744 877744 847630 847630 933966 933966 
Control mean 0.219 0.367 0.035 0.669 0.178 0.341 0.439 0.093 
95% confidence intervals in brackets 
Included country and year fixed effects. 
Standard errors clustered at country level. 
Small: abortion legal grounds expanded from “to save life & preserve physical health” to including “to preserve mental health”. 
Large: abortion legal grounds expanded from “to save life” only to including “to preserve mental health”. 
Included only individuals that were still in school at age 12. 




TABLE A6. Balance of the treatment and comparison groups with and without propensity score weights  
 Propensity Score Weighted (GBM) Raw 
 Treatment Mean Comparison Mean Std. Eff. Size Treatment Mean Comparison Mean  Std. Eff. Size 
Age 27.75 27.75 0.00 27.91 28.00 -0.01 
Urban  0.47 0.47 -0.01 0.43 0.49 -0.12 
Highest level of education       
   never attended 0.24 0.25 -0.02 0.19 0.30 -0.29 
   primary/middle school 0.33 0.34 -0.02 0.38 0.30 0.18 
   secondary/post-primary 0.32 0.31 0.01 0.32 0.32 0.00 
   tertiary/post-secondary 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.08 0.08 
Marital status       
   never married 0.34 0.34 0.00 0.34 0.33 0.00 
   currently married 0.51 0.51 0.01 0.51 0.51 -0.02 
   currently living with partner 0.07 0.07 -0.04 0.06 0.09 -0.09 
   divorced or separated 0.05 0.06 -0.01 0.07 0.04 0.10 
   widow or widower 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 
Married once or more than once       
   never 0.34 0.34 0.00 0.34 0.33 0.00 
   once 0.59 0.59 0.00 0.58 0.59 -0.01 
   more than once 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.02 
   <missing> 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.07 
Partner has other wives 0.15 0.16 -0.02 0.13 0.19 -0.16 
    <missing> 0.43 0.43 0.01 0.44 0.41 0.07 
Wealth score quintile       
   lowest quintile 0.21 0.20 0.03 0.19 0.22 -0.06 
   lower quintile 0.19 0.20 -0.01 0.19 0.21 -0.04 
   middle quintile 0.18 0.19 -0.02 0.18 0.19 -0.02 
   higher quintile 0.19 0.19 0.01 0.18 0.19 -0.01 
   highest quintile 0.23 0.23 0.00 0.26 0.20 0.12 
Ever given birth  0.67 0.67 -0.01 0.67 0.68 -0.02 
   <missing> 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
Age at first sex  17.05 17.04 0.00 17.00 16.98 0.01 
   <missing> 0.23 0.24 -0.01 0.24 0.22 0.05 
Age at first birth  19.86 19.89 -0.01 19.90 19.97 -0.02 
   <missing> 0.37 0.37 0.01 0.36 0.37 -0.02 
Prefers no more children 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.28 0.24 0.10 
Months to wait before another child (months) 47.62 48.15 -0.01 50.83 45.56 0.14 
   <missing> 0.41 0.42 -0.02 0.44 0.42 0.04 
Country       
   Burkina Faso 0.08 0.09 -0.06 0.00 0.19 -2.83 
   Ethiopia 0.21 0.19 0.05 0.29 0.07 0.50 
   Ghana 0.02 0.09 -0.41 0.00 0.17 -3.65 
   Kenya 0.18 0.15 0.07 0.27 0.04 0.52 
   Niger 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.17 
   Nigeria 0.27 0.26 0.02 0.18 0.34 -0.42 
   Uganda 0.12 0.10 0.06 0.17 0.04 0.34 
   Cote d'Ivoire 0.06 0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.13 -1.55 
Std. eff. size: standardized effect size; GBM: generalized boosted model
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TABLE A7. Free access to different types of contraceptives  
  Free access to both LARC and SARC 
  Yes No All 
  All women 
Free access to SARC only Yes 15,998 (77.69%) 4,593 (22.31%) 20,591 (100%) 
 No 0 (0%) 9,242 (100%) 9,242 (100%) 
  Current contraceptive users 
Free access to SARC only Yes 5,207 (84.04%) 989 (15.96%) 6,196 (100%) 
 No 0 (0%) 2,383 (100%) 2,383 (100%) 
LARC: long-acting reversible contraceptives, including implants and intrauterine devices. 




TABLE A8. Variable importance from recursive partitioning   
Variable Variable Importance 
marital status 507.169 
knowledge score 352.421 
age 265.760 
country 251.780 
educational level 83.025 
free access  29.225 
wealth quintile 27.425 
information score 15.219 
urban 11.727 
The variable importance score indicates how impactful each variable is in the final decision tree model 
generated from recursive partitioning. The higher the score is, the more the model uses a variable to 




TABLE A9. Free access to both long- and short-acting reversible contraceptives by facility type 
Facility type Number of facilities Number of facilities with free access (%) 
Hospital 502 207 (41.2%) 
Health center 1030 490 (47.6%) 
Health clinic 127 3 (2.4%) 
Other health facility 121 53 (43.8%) 
Private practice 8 0 (0.0%) 
Dispensary 196 153 (78.1%) 
Pharmacy/chemist/drug 463 0 (0.0%) 
Boutique/shop 5 0 (0.0%) 
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